How the world didn't end this time

 
Did you really expect the world to end on 21 December, 2012? Again?

Numerous times before has the end of the world been anticipated in various cultures. It's a fascinating concept, because it (quite often) allows for something else, something to follow after the world - as we know it - has ended. Something like a new beginning - which is, normally, just like the world before it, only better. Thus, the imagination of world's end is characteristically entangled with utopian ideas of new start, usually for a select few (since the bad of the old days must have been caused by something of somebody, and this source of evil must be uprooted before there can be something new).

Such concepts are quite familiar to the student of religion.

However, the alleged ending of the world this time also fascinated the larger populace. Yet, was anybody able to elaborate upon why they were expecting the end of the world? Apparently, the Mayan calender's cessation gained most of the headlines, combined with astronomical observations of a peculiar alignment of the planets of our solar system. (An alignment that would lead others to contend that it would change something in humankind's consciousness, but would not lead to an "end" of the world in a literal sense.) In the end, the pre-21 December media craze was born out of crypto- or pseudo-scientific claims that borrowed a lot from religious ideas. Moreover, the "sources" it was based on were more rumor than that, than sources to rely on.

The end of the world, now and again

Frankly, the idea of "history" as a timeline with a fixated starting and ending point is a strange one. It does not correspond well with what our (natural) environment would suggest. Nature would rather point to a cyclical order of things, which led most cultures close to nature to develop cyclical understandings of time. The idea of a "goal of history", a teleology, is not self-evident. But where does it come from? - This idea is probably nowhere so pronounced as in the notion of progress. And while other cultures may have had some understanding of the progression of time, the influential modern idea of progress that has become a totalistic paradigm was developed in what we often term "the West", meaning related Western European cultures originating in a Judeo-Christian tradition (among other influences).

While the Bible is not the only source and example for a teleological sense of time, it is likely the most influential one, especially with the addition of the Christian New Testament. However, whereas the inherent concept of "progress" toward the Messias' second coming made itself independent of its biblical context and came to dominate all aspects of human existence in Western modernity (economy, culture, science, psychology, biology etc.), it is originally coupled with a vision of an end to the world. There is no everlasting progress but an "end of history" - which, interestingly, was mirrored symbolically in Fukuyama's work in the 1990s on the "final" victory of democracy (and capitalism, which thus became identified with the "good side" or Christianity in this race toward armageddon) over communism. In the Christian context, the world will be destroyed, and a new world will arise where all survivors are to exist side by side with the Triune God.

This knowledge serves as the background in popular expectations of the apocalypse. Of course, in other cultures we find other but often similar visions of the end of the world. In Indian cosmologies, for instance, time is divided into different ages (kalpa) that each end with the annihilation of the world. In Buddhism, each kalpa is presided over by a different Buddha, and the end of each age is initialized by a period of decline in which salvation from the woeful realm of constant reincarnation (samsara) is hardly possible anymore. In these times, the birth of a Buddha - who will found the next age - can be expected. Historically, this has time and again led to huge salvationist movements in preparation for the coming of the Buddha Maitreya in China.

Do numbers matter?

Certain numerologically significant years have often served to anchor such salvationist expectations. In China, it was estimated that the period of decline of the Dharma (the truth betold by the Buddha) would last 500 years after a certain amount of years of prosperity. The coming of the alleged date in the 5th century caused widespread anxiety and upheaval. However, one might say it did pass without bringing about the feared (or hoped-for) results. Handily, the date could be estimated differently according to various variables and sources (does that ring a bell?). The evaluation of the occurance (or not) of the predicted changes differed also, of course. In any event, this is to say two things: First, that the sociological and political implications of salvationist ideas (and movements) were very real - just a common example: The fall of the Mongol Yuan dynasty was initiated by a Maitreya-inspired peasant uprising. Second, the date of the apocalypse is subject to interpretation and change. We might say it is a cultural (an anthropological?) constant in the history of humankind.

Clearly, the time relating to an event of such existential significance can not be arbitrary. Some kind of meaning has to be connected with the end of the world (arbitrarity would render the event pointless, even senseless, which would cause serious cosmological trouble). Thus, usually it is numerologically auspicious dates that get picked for the apocalypse. As the term 'millenniarist expectation' would suggest already, in the Christian context turns of the millennium are especially prone to mark the world's end. (Remember the fuss about the year 2000? For me, there is no reason to believe the millennarian turn before would have been any less anticipated. In my opinion, the Jazz trio Medeski, Martin & Wood put this quite aptly in the title of their live album recorded just before the turn of the millennium: "End of the World Party (Just in Case)":)

So why would the world end a week ago in 2012, when it had not numerous times (on more auspicious occasions) before? There was no legitimate claim, not even religiously, just some crypto-scientific ideas about the end of the Maya calendar that lacked solid foundation. (This link to a NASA report does not mean that I do believe in what science claims to know about the world. I put it here simply to show how easily rumors about Maya prophecies of the apocalypse can be discarded. This renders the issue a dispute between scientists and believers-in-the-apocalypse - if there was ever anyone who really believed in it this time.) What I want to express here is neither that belief in the end of the world at a certain date is unfounded, nor that it is stupid or dangerous. But it is a constant companion of human cultures, and in this sense quite normal. It has occurred several times before, and it will occur again. Since most cultural phenomena that have existed for that long do have some function (and thus make sense), perhaps there is also some logic to the belief in world's end. We only have to focus on the most prevalent visionof mondane destruction there is at the moment: Even scientists support the idea that there might be an end to the world of humanity if global warming were to continue (or any other scenario of human destruction of the world). Ironically, the reason for this apocalyptic vision is to be found in the idea of progress, which itself in its original religious context was meant to be leading to a desired armageddon and the end of the sinful world as we know it. This may sound like a self-fulfilling prophecy, only that we humans now possess the means to bring about cosmological apocalypse that was meant to be a divine plan...


Oh gosh, we have become so self-conscious... Personally, I don't believe in religious arguments for the end of the world as long as there is no scientific proof rendering it probable or at least possible. Scientific proof here refers to empirical visibility, testability, and falsibility. For me, the reasons for an apocalypse ought to be exoteric, not revealed to a select few. The latter would make them a matter of personal belief. As long as any science does not claim what it cannot prove empirically, it should be safe to believe in its validity. Why should only some people have access to the truth? How could the truth only be revealed to a select few at a particular point in time? Why not try to make it objective and accessible for everyone to test? I have to admit, believing in any kind of apocalypse is not typically a rational process of decision-making. But if there ever was a beginning (as even science contends), it is quite reasonable to assume that there will be an end. Yet, I'll happily tread middle ground and busy myself with what is going on in-between, the here and now. And this tells me that it rather is the idea of progress we need to focus on. Because this very idea may well lead us straight to armageddon either way.

The state of revolution - rising civil societies and how the concurrent system of power is unfit to deal with them

Conventional politics (World Economic Forum) is unfit to deal with the current regime changes in the middle East, because it is inherently interested in stability and cementing the status quo so as to maximise economic profits, and thereby has no capacity for understanding or even supporting political changes brought about by local civil societies; whereas many of today's revolutions in South America and the Middle East have built connections at the alternative World Social Forum (WSF). A fiasco for established neoliberal policies and an articulate hint that we need a reformation, if not a revolution, of that current "world" system. If we did not change anything, would it be exaggeration to fear a confrontation of democratic initiatives and capitalist interests on double fronts: both within Western society (where the civil society's wish for more participation and accountability and ecological concerns contrast with long-term security, stability, and exploitability needed for maximum economic profit), and between Western corporations (not democratically accounted for) and rising local civil societies (whose fight against economicolonial ["ecolonial"?] activities is supported by Western civil society organisations)??? And what about the inherent contradiction, as actors on both sides are of Western provenance, may easily be confused, and thus conveniently made target for holistic, fundamentalist ideologies? -> Can we really go on as before? Will a more morally upright politics suffice long-term? - As the "changeability" of the likes of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy is showing quite clearly, conventional party politics is NO option fit for the upcoming challenges, because too overtly entangled with big business.

Start gathering knowledge (begin with Wikipedia, for Chrissake), update your frame of mind, change the world! There are lots and lots of interesting and like-minded people... The "end of history" reached by Capitalism's global spread is a myth! The impossibility or the not permitting of thinking alternatives is unhealthy for any ideology whatsoever, as it causes them to become dogmatic and fundamentalist.

The "Internet Revolutions" and the Possibility of a Different Kind of "Revolution" in China?

These thoughts originate in an interesting blog post by Alex Pasternack on the Twitter-generated "Jasmine Revolution" (or not?) in China on February 20.
The form of organised protest may well change in a virtual reality-influenced environment, especially as regards the possibilities of organising protest in an authoritarian, monitored society.

Maybe the combination of social media and pseudoevents points a surreal way forward for public dissent in China in the web era: organizers needn’t actually gather people, as Falun Gong supporters quietly but visibly did in the late 1990s around the capital, at the movement’s eventual peril, and as occasionally happens today, in gatherings of petitioners and others that are often promptly shut down by scores of police.

Instead, they can simply spread word about a protest via one of China’s networking sites, then wait for the police – along with the journalists, and perhaps a few sympathizers with cameras – to show up and shut down something that isn’t even there. You don’t just get a “protest”; you get a display of fear by the government. Do it again, and the number of “protests” grows, along with the number of police. Repeat. [...]

Interesting to see in what direction "social networks" on the Internet will influence "social gatherings" or "protest", or indeed "social relations" in a wider sense.
Meanwhile, yesterday's regimes continue using force on their own people whose support they have long lost...

post-national Taiwan?

Hypothesis:

In order to avoid becoming a subdued colonised dependent again -- this time the PRC's -- Taiwan might have to develop nationalism first to become a post-national society in the future. Where there's no (internationally recognised) nation, there can be no post-nationalist structure. By developing a post-nationalist attitude transcending conventional politics and replacing the political sphere with "entertainment", "culture", or "economic gain", the Taiwanese would risk their political independence and freedom. This would not be selling out, rather would it be incredibly naive.

Criticizing Han Ethnocentrism in Taiwan and China

To be clarified beforehand: I am radically anti-racist and anti-nationalist, I consider proselytizing a crime against an individuals self-determination (although some religious determinations turned out to be better advocates of preserving cultural identities and propagating cultural diversity), and I wish for mutual respect, tolerance, and one multicultural global society without discrimination nor borders.

Let Taiwan serve as a two-fold case in point for my argument, which is to say that there is a very frightening component about Chinese Han Ethnocentrism, something masquerading as "cultural" which is very hard to distinguish from other areas such as politics and ethnicity.
By referring to two layers, I mean looking at Taiwan from an micro and a macro level angle. The macro level is rather easy to describe, since it entails the way the Chinese empire spread through the course of many centuries, incorporating colonized local people and by way of proving its "cultural" superiority convincing most ethnic groups to submit to and overtake Chinese culture. This is especially true today, when life becomes ever faster, information can be accessed almost everywhere, and there is fierce competition for job opportunities with an widening gap of the haves vs. the not-haves. This means as long as there is no real appreciation for any non-Chinese culture and multicultural diversity within the so-called ethnic Chinese group, people with a distinct culture have to get rid of some of their cultural traits, especially those that might potentially clash with Chinese custom and behaviour.
I am to this day convinced that there is no genuine appreciation of foreignness in China. In part this is due to an overaggressive nationalism which was launched in the beginning of the 20th century to confront Western invasion into China, and at the same time was a reaction to what was felt necessary at the time: the building of a strong nation state to compete with other nations. Along with a nation state, the concept of "race" was prevalent at that time and in a process of westernization (as means to self-strengthening, without losing cultural roots) seemingly had to be introduced or at least, if already existing, modified in China. Keeping traditional cultural roots didn't stay at the political agenda of the most successful movements for long. The Communist regime stands for breaking ties with most fundamental traditional Chinese idea(l)s, especially those relating to society and social relationships. However, it was constantly felt necessary to strengthen a certain nationalist awareness, which after the end of the possibility of Communist legitimation took over as one of the two foundations of the modern Chinese nation state, the other being economic prosperity. In combination they aim for China becoming the world's foremost economic power. This ideology necessarily has a couple of dogmas that cannot be touched, among them the triple 'T' (Tibet, Taiwan, Tian'anmen), which cause a lot of harm in and around China and should be examined critically. Excuses centering on China's exotic nature ("Maybe the Chinese are like that") are not of any help here, because the root of the problem is not genuinely Chinese but rather imported - it lies in the concepts of nationalism and capitalist economy. Current Chinese society is in these aspects very far from what traditional China may have looked like. My criticism as such is thus not aimed at something inherently "Chinese", but on nowadays implementations and importations of essentially Western ideas. I actually would very much like China to be more "Chinese", as I think this ongoing marriage with some mutilated currents of Western thought is a very dangerous one. Realistically, I am not hoping for many Chinese people to accept this criticism, something that may be due to national pride having already taken deep roots in most of the population. What I myself cannot accept, however, is that innocent people in a country separate from China should suffer from dogma-infested actions deriving from this misguided interpretation of outdated Western concepts.

The funny and really scary thing about Chinese ethnocentrism is that in cooperation with the Chinese language that doesn't favour definite word-meaning relationships it can quite easily clothe its appearance in more pleasant phrases such as "cultural Chineseness" (which, apparently, is aimed to include all "cultural" Chinese from overseas - Singapore, USA, Indonesia - in the great Chinese community whose representative is, of course, the People's Republic - there is even a word for this that bridges the gap between ethnicity, politics, and culture: 華人世界). This does amazingly often work with Western scholars and politicians who take Chinese phrases (designed to be foremost pleasant to hear) for their concrete meaning, mostly without having the time to cast a critical look on how those phrases relate to reality.
To me, if an ethnic group (however wildly constructed this "ethnicity" may be) separates itself as clearly as is the case with Chinese "cultural" ambitions, which at closer look reveal quite direct imperialist intentions, anti-Chinese sentiment in these places is quite a natural thing to expect. As is the case in Taiwan. Taiwanese "ethnic" identity is clearly constructed against and under the threat of Chinese ambitions to take over the island of Formosa. If there were no political pressure on Taiwan, the formation of Taiwanese identities would not have to be directed against China, but it could more naturally evolve as some sort of post-nationalist citizen- and democracy-based identity which is much needed indeed, if we are to confront Taiwan's current and future problems in society and human-nature relations effectively.

At the centre of the problem may well lie the question: What on earth are ethnic Han? - As a friend of mine put it once, the "Han" are a wild mix of different peoples, quite naturally so if one considers traditional Chinese political and cultural concepts (i.e. the imperial claim to represent everything under heaven, of course every cultural group can become part of "everything under heaven"). This makes the "Han" distinction itself more a cultural one than an ethnic one. "Friendly takeover" has happened before, many of the people now considered "Han" were "barbarians" a few centuries ago - I have a hard time believing that the "Han" may be supposed to just be much more effective in out-populating so many peoples. The modern Han race is settled on ideology and mythology, with history serving as its primary legitimation (the "5000 years of Chinese culture"), at the same time "Han" is essentially a synonym for "Chinese" today, representing about 93% of the PRC population, which is pretty convenient in legitimating China's sole representation by "Han" politicians. Some hint in how arbitrarily the "Chinese race" has been constructed can be found in comparing differences between Han and "Manchu", who are officially recognized as a minority, that is, not "Han", and differences between inner-Han groups with their own language etc. (for instance, Hakka, Hoklo, Cantonese). (On another note this may tell us a lot with Chinese preoccupation with the Northern part of the country, whilst the South has always been thought of as populated by uncivilized barbarians.)
All I want to say is that I question the Han qualifying as a single ethnic group that can be used by serious scholarship. As long as there is no genetic evidence, I keep on doubting. It appears to me that the construction process serves very real political purposes. A politically manipulated term, however, can not be mingled with independent science.

Then there is what I called the "micro level" of Han ethnocentrism.
Again, taking Taiwan as an example, on one hand the island is the concrete aim of Chinese cultural-imperialist ambitions (macro level). On the other hand, there is Han ethnocentrism within Taiwan. Although cultural diversity is recognised in Taiwan by distinguishing four different groups (Aboriginals, Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders), there is considerable cloudiness to how distinct the groups are. For instance, a big part of the Hoklo-"Taiwanese" are comprised of Hoklo-Hakka and former flatland aboriginals marriages. The only group easily distinguishable are the mainlanders retreating with Chiang Kaishek in 1949, although intermarriage with Taiwanese Hoklo or wives from overseas are common, so that lines get blurred. Talking more specifically about "ethnicity", it seems that all groups are taken together as "ethnic Chinese" (= Han), the only outside group being Taiwans "First Nations", the austronesian aborignals.
Let's continue this further. The Austronesians have been subdued by the influx and weapon-technological advance of immigrants from China to the point of marginalisation. Until very recently, the "ethnically Chinese" people have never doubted their superiority to the aboriginals in any aspect. This is why they took their land and resettled them in concrete buildings without bothering to ask for the politically inferior groups opinion. As Fiorella Allio, engaged French anthopologist among the Yami tribe, tells that the Yami on the Taiwanese island Botel Tobago has been resettled, and their traditional fishing grounds have become a nuclear waste deposit site. How much more disrespectful can you be in dealing with other people? All of this is reflected in the way Taiwanese politicians treat the land - there has been no consideration about a policy's effects on the natural environment (ideological reasons for Chinese indifference towards the land - for many decades, most officials have been mainlanders - can be found elsewhere - Taiwan has always been considered a tropical backwater of no use to Chinese officials. Interestingly, this has changed significantly over the past years, but to a bigger degree for mainland China than for local politicians, I fear). Still, the Aboriginals today may be welcome folklore to many Taiwanese, but they are not really an integrated part of society. They have lower incomes and education levels, higher mortgage and unemployment rates, are prone to become alcoholic, and even the tribes living next door are often separated from "Han" society and driven further out as settlement patterns spread. Settlement spreads, but not to include them, but drive them further away. Professor Hsia Chu-joe 夏鑄九 (National Taiwan University, Graduate Institute of Building and Planning) whom I heard give a talk on the planned new law on the Management of State Property Land at the NGO House in Taipei a few weeks ago put it in these terms: "When are the Han ever going to accept the Aboriginals as people just like themselves? When are they going to accept anybody outside themselves?

Although historically the Chinese political system apparently has been particularly adept at assimilating foreign cultural-ethnic groups, the outcome of this assimilation process seems to have been dictated by political power relations. Coming from a stronger, even hegemonic, position of power, the Chinese were able to conquer and assimilate outsiders according to their own terms. For as long as they were still culturally distinct, conquered minorities must have been on the marginal peripheries of a Chinese-dominated society. Support for this assumption can be found in the recent history of Taiwan’s colonization (where the trend has been somewhat stopped) where Plains Aborigines were married into becoming Hoklo-Chinese and whole settlements switched ethnic affiliation (Brown 2004), whereas the remaining distinct Aboriginal peoples live on the margins of society. But it can also be found in South China itself, where minorities live in economically and structurally weak regions and have tremendous trouble asserting themselves in a Chinese-dominated economy and polity. The recent colonization of Tibet by immensely successful Han entrepreneurs, without Tibetans profiting as much from the region’s economic opening, is another case in point. Something similar may happen in the vast, thinly populated space north of the Manchurian border in Siberia, where hundreds of thousands of Chinese have migrated.

Chinese Han ethnocentrism from China, as relating to Taiwan, is manifested in that it does not take into account the Taiwanese people's opinion regarding the future and status of their island which is a country independent from China. We might perceive this nationalist ethnocentrism as sort of outsider-friendly (even for hardline unificationists there must be some sense of Taiwan being different from China, since otherwise there wouldn't be need for such a thing as "unification") and dogmatic. Taiwan has to be kept from declaring official independence to uphold the mythological foundation of the Chinese nation state. This is a very aggressive view on cross-straits relations, especially for its denying Taiwan to make use of the basic international right for self-determination by threatening it to use violence. The only solution to this problem is either China giving up its territorial claims on Taiwan (not likely to happen), or the Taiwanese people giving in to a mixture of international pressure and economic promises (much more likely to happen). From a moral point of departure, the lack of Western support for democratic Taiwan is of great concern to me. This undermines Western democracies moral authority even further, since we are essentially buying into authoritarian China's promise of a great economic market, and selling out democratic kin in return... Apparently, 2012 is the year to look out for. If we are lucky, the world will be ending that year anyway.


For all that is good, and if a society really wants to progress, it has to look beyond the confines of its own cultural and ethnic boundaries. It has to learn to position itself in the place of any other culture that it is facing. This is the only way to enhance mutual understanding and avert competition that might lead to subordination of one people under the other. I consider this an essentially globalised human desire, because it will be the only way to the traditional Chinese ideal of "harmony"　和諧 within society, in the relations with other societies, and in dealing with the environment. To give these thoughts some additional weight, let me quote famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz:

"the primary question for any cultural institution anywhere, now that nobody is leaving anybody else alone and isn´t ever again going to, is not whether everything is going to come seamlessly together, or whether, contrariwise, we are all going to persist in our separate prejudices. It is whether human beings are going to be able, in Java or Connecticut, through law, anthropology, or anything, to imagine principled lives they can practically lead [together]."

萊比錫書展，我的感想

每年三月是萊比錫書展，德國第二大的 （只法蘭克福的更大）
這次也是臺北書展基金會第一次來到萊比錫
有許多臺灣作家演講
其中有比較 established 的 （陳玉慧）、有代表年輕臺灣文學的 （伊格言）、也有動心的詩人 （鴻鴻）
很好！

我很幸運，有機會認識了一些很善良的人
演講也算是很成功的
有德國出版公司對伊格言的作品很有興趣
所以十分希望明年臺北書展基金會可以再來

我雖然不在那工作，仍然大部分的時間都在他們攤子那裏
或隔壁的臺北代表處之攤子

因爲我們與臺灣只能有偷偷的國際關係，所以臺灣也不能有所謂的領事館
雖然功能一莫一樣
you may call that humiliating
since that is what it is
要不然威力的鄰居會生氣
德國商人可能沒有別國家商人的好處
太可惜了

我跟臺北代表處的一些人聊聊天，不小心談政治
代表處員對臺灣獨立國的未來並不樂觀
因爲已經可看到將來的暗示
國民黨政府不只不願意對金錢外交再花那麽多錢
而在外交的預算案都逐漸減少

臺北代表處在德國能花的錢越來越少

已經不知道明年能不能再來書展
1992年第一次來的
這種文化代表很重要：
雖然中國的攤子一定比我們的大、比我們的漂亮、中國作家比我們多、也一定會收較多注意
還是有人故意來找我們
還是有人在管臺灣小寶島的命運

因爲他們知道臺灣與中國不同的部分在哪
他們知道臺灣人努力地達到自由和民主
給他們看臺灣不斷以這種努力為澳很重要
這樣對臺灣已經有意見的人才不會放棄它

去年換了執政黨對代表處很有關係
在德國非常受歡迎的臺灣代表謝志偉被趕走
換了一個官僚主義者
代表處員告訴我，德國記者打電話想知道臺灣對莫一件事情的看法，
新的代表不會出一件
這樣工作氣氛對代表處員來說已經沒有意義了
好像代表對臺灣這地沒有特別的意見

這對臺灣在西方人的角度内有不好的結果
記者的影響力隨處都很大
記者如果不會收代表處的意見資料

就會去找別的資源
這樣做會間接地幫助中國看法更普及
而注意臺灣的人越來越少

支持臺灣這個民主國家的人
不少
可是他們需要先見到臺灣人民自己願意不惜代價地保護珍貴的民主制度
以及表示臺灣人自己要民主、要平等、要獨立
目前還趕得到時間
怕七年後會太晚
目前的政府已在準備經濟合作與中國大陸越來越密切，更多地靠大陸
同時把國際代表減少
對我來說，都暗示到我不想經歷的未來

我們一起努力吧
我們別分開兩派
我們做真正的我們吧！

50 Jahre tibetischer Aufstand

Der Deutschlandfunk hatte eine Reportage im heutigen Kalenderblatt:
(leider dürfen die Beiträge des Kalenderblattes, jeden Tag um 9:05 Uhr, nicht mehr als stream online gestellt werden, darum hier der reine Text)

Aufstand der Tibeter

Vor 50 Jahren: 80.000 Tote bei Protesten gegen die chinesische Besatzung

Von Otto Langels

Schon im Herbst 1949, gleich nach der Machtübernahme der Kommunisten in Peking, erhob China Anspruch auf das Territorium Tibets. Ein Jahr später marschierte die Volksbefreiungsarmee Mao Zedongs in den Himalaya-Staat ein. Versuche der tibetischen Bevölkerung, sich mit der kommunistischen Regierung zu arrangieren, schlugen fehl. Die Proteste und bewaffneten Aktionen gegen die Besatzungsmacht eskalierten schließlich Anfang März 1959.

"Am frühen Morgen des 10. März 1959 versammelten sich nach Sonnenaufgang Tausende von Tibetern vor der Sommerresidenz des Dalai Lama. Die große Menschenmenge strömte wegen eines Gerüchts zusammen, wonach die chinesischen Kommunisten planten, den Dalai Lama zu einer Kulturveranstaltung in das chinesische Militärhauptquartier einzuladen und dort festzunehmen. Bis zum Mittag hatte sich der Aufruhr in einen allgemeinen Volksaufstand verwandelt."

So beschreibt der chinesisch-amerikanische Historiker Chen Jian in seiner Geschichte der tibetischen Rebellion den Ausbruch der Unruhen in der Hauptstadt Lhasa.
Die Vorgeschichte des Aufstands reicht in das Jahr 1949 zurück, unmittelbar nach der Gründung der Volksrepublik China, als die kommunistische Regierung Jahrhunderte alte Ansprüche auf die Himalaya-Region geltend machte. Peking ignorierte die 1913 proklamierte staatliche Unabhängigkeit Tibets und erklärte, das Land von den so genannten "imperialistischen Kräften" und dem "reaktionären Feudalregime in Lhasa" befreien zu wollen. 1950 marschierte die chinesische Armee in Tibet ein. Ein Jahr später schloss eine Delegation des Dalai Lama, des geistlichen und weltlichen Oberhaupts der Tibeter, mit der chinesischen Regierung ein 17-Punkte-Abkommen. Darin heißt es unter Anderem:

"Das tibetische Volk soll in die große Völkerfamilie des Mutterlandes der Volksrepublik China zurückkehren. Das tibetische Volk hat das Recht zur Ausübung regionaler Autonomie unter der Führung der zentralen Volksregierung."

In den Augen der Tibeter war das Abkommen jedoch nicht rechtmäßig, sondern durch massiven politischen und militärischen Druck aus Peking zustande gekommen.

"Tibet sah sich diesem großen Nachbarn aus dem Osten ausgesetzt, alleine, und da blieb nichts anderes, als das Beste aus der Situation zu machen. Und die einzige Möglichkeit war natürlich, den Feind zu beschwichtigen."

Weiter geht es hier.

Dafür gibt es ein Interview mit dem Gesandten des Dalai Lama in Deutschland, Keysan Gyaltsen.

Die Lage beschreibt er schon ziemlich drastisch, v.a. wenn man die dürftige Quellenlage zur Hand nimmt. "Das ganze Land ein großes Gefängnis"... Ist natürlich die Darstellung nur der einen Seite. Dennoch: man muss doch nicht das Land abschließen bzw. für ausländische Tibeter, die die Unabhängigkeit vertreten, unzugänglich machen. Ist ja schon so, als würde ihnen damit ein - ich möchte es mal "Menschenrecht" nennen, genommen, nämlich die Rückkehr in die Heimat. Stimmt schon, das passiert heute an leider viel zu vielen Orten. Auch kommt das Interview um einiges nüchterner und realistischer daher als so manche Partei-Propaganda.

Die Zeit hat schon etwas zynisches an sich. Lässt man sie durch Nichtstun verstreichen, löst sie manche Fragen wie von selbst. In einigen Jahren wird es die Debatte um den "Freiheitskampf der Tibeter", über das Wie und Wann, vielleicht gar nicht mehr geben. Tibet könnte dann so in die VR inkulturiert sein, dass die tibetische Kultur zu einem musealen Artefakt wird. Zwar wird dann hoffentlich Frieden herrschen, aber die Tibeter werden in ihrer Mehrzahl wohl Chinesen sein. Da können die einzelnen Personen vor Ort natürlich nichts für.

Ich mache mir bloß gerade Gedanken, über welch extraordinäre Macht das Modell des "Nationalstaates" eigentlich verfügt, wenn es Legitimation für Besetzung, Ausübung von Vorherrschaft, Bildung einer einheitlichen "nationalen" Kultur werden kann. Ohne dass es als historisches Produkt hinterfragt würde! Es gibt keine real existierenden Grenzen (von einigen natürlichen mal abgesehen), sie sind nur künstlich von uns gezogen. Ich habe beim Schreiben einer Hausarbeit über die Vormacht des "Staates" über "Religionen" (bei vorheriger "säkularer" Trennung der beiden "Bereiche") reflektiert, doch das gleiche ließe sich auch von "Kulturen" oder "Ethnien" sagen. Dieses Modell des modernen Nationalstaates hat uns, der Erdbevölkerung, viel Leid und Zwietracht gebracht. Vielleicht gehört es deswegen in die Schublade der (postmodernen) Geschichte.

Bemerkungen zu Tibet und Taiwan

Von den Protesten gegen die chinesische Besetzung in Tibet habt ihr sicherlich erfahren.
Als Antwort auf einen Zeit Online-Artikel von Ruth Kirchner dazu und darauf folgende Kommentare veröffentliche ich dieses Statement, inklusive einer kurzen Einschätzung der Unterschiede in den Situationen Tibets und Taiwans, die beide dem Machtgebahren Pekings ausgeliefert sind:


Warum soll es eine Schande sein, Radio Free Asia zu zitieren?
Es ist schließlich auch keine Schande, für gewöhnlich die staatliche Nachrichtenagentur Xinhua zu bringen...
(Eine Reaktion auf den Kommentar:

Einseitige Berichterstattung

Dieser Bericht ist eine Schande für diese Zeitung, denn der Author beruft sich im Wesentlichen auf zwei Quellen:

Radio Free Asia(ideologischer Radiobomber aus Washongton D.C.) und

Das Tibetische Zentrum für Menschenrechte und Demokratie (TCHRD), welches von National Endowment for Democracy (NED) massiv unterstützt wird.

Objektiver Journalismus mit freundlicher Unterstützung von den USA... )

Guter Journalismus findet eben auch in ethischer Verantwortung vor dem eigenen Gewissen statt, eine "Objektivität" ist bei einem Thema so heiß wie diesem gleich so gut wie überhaupt nicht wahrbar. Nach unseren Maßstäben ist die VR China jedenfalls ein autoritärer, nicht-demokratischer Staat, und indem wir unsere hehren demokratischen Ideale wahren wollen heißt das auch, demokratische Gruppierungen und speziell das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker zu unterstützen.
Es is eine Schande, dass dieses zugunsten wirtschaftlicher Vorteile mit Füßen getreten wird!
Insofern kann ich alezzos höchst abwertende Einschätzung weder teilen noch nachvollziehen. Es ist nur recht und billig, dass politische Organisationen finanziell unterstützt werden, auch wenn das Geld aus den USA stammt - die VR finanziert ja ebenfalls massenhaft Propagandastudios.

Dank auch an Konrad Hao für seine Einschätzung.
Die Situationen Tibets und Taiwans unterscheiden sich jedoch in einem Punkte gravierend:
Bei den tibetischen Unruhen handelt es sich um innerstaatliche Angelegenheiten (so bitter das ist), ein Eingriff von außen ist also ohne weiteres weder zu rechtfertigen noch zu ermöglichen. Taiwan, oder richtiger die Republik China, hingegen ist ein souveräner Staat und hat der VR niemals formal, auch nicht formal unterstanden. Die VR hat absolut kein moralisch verhandelbares Recht, sich in die inneren Angelegenheiten Taiwans einzumischen - etwa, was eine formelle Unabhängigkeitserklärung betrifft. (Das Anti-Sezessionsgesetz von vor drei Jahren rechtfertigt auch den Einsatz von militärischer Gewalt durch die chinesische Regierung im Falle von Unruhen und "Abspaltungstendenzen" Tibets und Taiwans - ein Schlag ins Gesicht der faktischen staatlichen Souveränität Taiwans.)

Das Festhalten der Bundesregierung an der Ein-China-Politik und die jüngsten Aussagen Steinmeiers zeugen jedoch leider von einer rein ökonomisch diktierten, einseitigen und kurzsichtigen Politik und sind mit der beständigen Abmahnung Chinas ob seiner gravierenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen (die es natürlich gibt!) guten Gewissens nicht vereinbar, degradieren die Menschenrechtsthematik zu bloßen Worthülsen ohne konkrete Handlungsbasis. Dies ist eine moralisch verkommene und verlorene Politik und durch keine wirtschaftlichen Vorteile der Welt zu rechtfertigen!

Vorhin habe ich mich mit einem Taiwaner über seine Jugend und der "Weißen Terror", den er selbst erlebt hat, gesprochen. Eine ähnliche Situation kennen wir Ostdeutschen noch aus eigener Erfahrung, und wir waren (und sind) uns einig, so einig wie man sich nur sein kann, in dem einen: Nie, nie wieder soll so etwas passieren!

Um es zu verhindern, sind mir viele politische Mittel recht, - eine Politik aber, die stillschweigend eine ebensolche Diktatur stützt, macht sich mitschuldig an all denen (größtenteils Unschuldigen), die der Willkürherrschaft zum Opfer fallen!


Das sollte unseren ("Real-")Politikern zu denken geben, und nicht als Kollateralschaden wirtschaftlicher Gelüste enden. Mit welchem Recht verlangen wir Demokratie und Menschenrechte für unseresgleichen und können dabei übersehen, dass sie anderswo mit Füßen getreten werden bzw. im taiwanischen Fall (laut Freedom House seit drei Jahren die freieste Demokratie Asiens - was mancher wieder eine "tendenziöse", von Amerika finanzierte Stiftung nennen mag) eine blühende, stetig im Entwickeln begriffene Demokratie durch eine kommenden "Roten Riesen" fatal in ihrer Existenz bedroht wird. Von den Auswirkungen, die beständige militärische Bedrohung (und damit Einflussnahme) auf die Psychologie eines demokratischen Landes, das dazu nicht von demokratischen "Brüdern" geschützt wird, soll hier gar nicht erst weiter gesprochen werden...

Nicht nur müssen Tibet & Taiwan endlich frei werden dürfen, nein, China selbst muss den entscheidenden Schritt zur Freiheit wagen!
Vor allem muss das Bewusstsein, dass dies durchaus möglich ist, endlich weitere Verbreitung finden und darf nicht fortwährund in kurzfristig gewinnorientierten ökonomisch-politischen Maximen unterminiert werden - ich sage all dieses aus Liebe und Respekt zu China und seiner Kultur.

Why the UN and Taiwan Ought to Be Friends (Part 1)

聯合國與臺灣爲什麽需要當朋友

Due to parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2008 as well as two referenda over an application to enter the United Nations under the name “Taiwan” (which are harshly opposed to by the government of the People’s Republic of China), even the German media have their focus on the beautiful island south-east of the Chinese mainland. On March 21 a new President will be elected and the Taiwanese will decide about the two referenda (one by each of the major parties).

(I have posted this article before in German language entitled "Warum Taiwan und die Vereinten Nationen Freunde werden sollten")

UN for Taiwan!

On January 23^rd, internationally reputed scholar Dr. Bruce Jacobs in an open letter called up on presidential candidates Ma Ying-jeou and Frank Hsieh to bundle forces and unitedly strive for UN-membership, that is, supporting one another’s referendum and call upon the populace to vote for both of them.

I recommend reading the letter (in Chinese) very much, as well as the comments made on Michael Turton’s post.

Jacobs is Director of the Taiwan Research Unit and professor for Asian studies at Monash University, Australia, and one of the world’s leading scholars on China-Taiwan relations. Personally, I admire his commitment in repeatedly speaking up for Taiwanese independence, and supplying theoretical and empirical facts to cement its importance. Regarding China scholars, this is nothing usual, since most academics try to maintain neutrality in political issues. However, being granted the benefits of insight and knowledge through thoroughly studying a given subject, in my eyes goes along with a certain responsibility to enlighten the public/ interested individuals about this very matter, to ones best knowing, ability, and fairness. I don’t agree with opportunistic relativisms, nor do I think that there is something coming close to absolute neutrality. We all carry a duty as public actors and agents of our own very conscience.

Of course, we need to get our facts straight in the first place.

It is matter of fact that Taiwan is a functioning, self-governing democracy which to date upholds official diplomatic relations with c. 30 nations around the world, being the sole representative of China there under the name “Republic of China” as according to the internationally accepted “One-China-Policy”.

Taiwan history in a short frame

In historical regard, Chinese control of the island is but a joke – a mere second in time. Jacobs goes as far as claiming that China ruled Taiwan under only 4 years: from 1945 to 1949, when it became part of the then Kuomintang-controlled Republic on the mainland. – Even if we were to add the years of Qing-rule, this would make some 200 years of Chinese rule. Jacobs, however, does rule out the Qing as being a Manchu, i.e. foreign, non-Chinese, dynasty. While this is a provocative way of putting it, one fact clearly stands out:

The People’s Republic has never ruled Taiwan, not for one single day, but is still making claims as the only possible representative of one unified China.

The first Chinese settlers, mostly Hoklo from Fujian and secondly Hakka from Guangdong, do not account for being ethnically being Han-Chinese, either. Until today, the differences between “Taiwanese” Hoklo and “Chinese” Han on the island of Taiwan are subject to conflicts and represent different stands regarding a distinct Taiwanese identity (as distinct from the Chinese mainland). These differences are visible also in China, although the government attempts to blur cultural distinctinveness in trying to form a homogenised country and strengthen their control and legitimize their rule.

While the first settlers arrived in Taiwan during the 16^th century, one can speak of a Chinese “influence” of the island only beginning in the 17^th century (in the early years of the Dutch occupation [1624-1662] there were merely 1000 – 1500 Chinese settlers on the whole island!). Ming-loyalist and Taiwanese national hero Zheng Cheng-gong (better known as Koxinga) retreated to Formosa in 1661, opening up the island to a mentionable degree for the first time.

In 1683, the Qing finally defeated Zheng and annexed it into Fujian province.

Not at all is it my intention to leave the Taiwanese aborigines out of Taiwanese history. They have been neglected and persecuted by all colonists, no matter if European or Chinese, until only recently (since 1994 they are mentioned in the constitution of the Republic of China, after the constitutional reform in 2000 they are referred to as “原住民“ and granted the rights of nationalities), most of these reforms made during the terms of the DPP-presidency. The aborigines now are granted autonomous regions (“their” lands if that “their” were not for the whole of Taiwan). Altogether, they consist of 13 officially recognised tribes, ten more still awaiting recognition. (This section followes the ethnographer Ingo Nentwig who also edited the German wikipedia entrance.)

It was only in the last 20 years of Qing rule that the government tried to incorporate Taiwan into the nation body systematically, climaxing in 1885 when it became declared a province, which indeed was primarily due to political and military concerns (Western and Japanese colonising interests).

In 1895, the Sino-Japanese war ended with the contract of Shimonoseki, making Taiwan and the Pescadores Japanese colony and putting an end to national and political integration of the complex Taiwanese society into the Chinese empire.

Despite being repressive and abusive, the Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan (1895-1945) is often viewed as having positive effects on Taiwan itself. The Japanese developed Taiwan industrially and invested in infrastructure and education (thus providing the basis for the Taiwanese post-World War economic development). Equally important, contact with Japanese nationalism left its impression on the locals; during the 1920s a variety of organisations, newspapers, and intellectuals engaged in deepening Taiwanese cultural consciousness. This point in history may well be regarded as the starting point of Taiwanese identity seriously becoming distinct intellectually.

(For most of the information above I am referring to Gunter Schubert)

The Cultural Significance

Any remodelling of the formation of a Taiwanese identity cannot leave out the “28 February 1947 incident” (二二八事件) (China was then still united under Republican rule). Corruption in the provincial government, unemployment, and supply shortcomings led to tensions between mainland-Chinese and the oppressed Taiwanese, and culminated on February 28, 1947 when protests spread from Taipei over the rest of the island. Taiwanese elites formed local comitees, but were defeated by Republican troops from the mainland in March. Following were persecution, looting, and torture which cost approximately 10 to 20000 people’s lives, leaving a severe gap between Taiwanese and 外生人, mainland Chinese.

The incident today is seen as a symbol for the origin of the Taiwanese independence movement.

The Japanese influence has been enormous, as you can still see today. Some of the oldest Taiwanese still alive rather know how to communicate in Japanese than in Mandarin.

Mother tongue with more than 60% of the population is 台語, a form of 閩南 (Minnan) which is also spoken in Fujian on the mainland. One in five speaks Mandarin as their mother tongue, and around 8% account for as Hakka. Fluency in Taiwanese is decreasing, though, in part due to KMT (國民黨) policies during the time of martial law which ended as recently as in 1987. Until then were native Taiwanese excluded from political participation at the national level since parliamentary elections were postponed until China would be united under the Republic (and MP mandates upheld until just then).

At the same time, the government pursued a strict policy of “sinisation”. Political power remained in the hands of the old elite that had retreated to Taiwan in 1949 under Chiang Kai-shek (bearing similarities with the retreat of Ming-loyalist Koxinga), the great majority of them born in China. The use of Taiwanese in schools and even at home was strictly prohibited and persecuted – the 50s and 60s are thus still labelled as the period of “white terror”.

As the propagated recovering of the mainland proved ever unlikelier with time progressing and the regime in Beijing gaining in power and legitimacy, acculturation of the island of Taiwan to KMT- and Sino-standards became a more immediate focus.

Political Development

However, political participation was possible at the local and provincial levels (according to Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People) since the 1950s, offering opportunities also for regime-critical politicians. What is further, politicians were obliged to cooperate with the local factions to keep the political system functioning.

A particularly precarious situation Taiwan faced in the 1970s; 1971 the Republic had to hand its UN seat over to the People’s Republic of China, meanwhile the United States normalised their bilateral relations with China and cut official diplomatic ties with the Republic.

The KMT-leadership responded with domestic reforms initiated by Chiang Kai-shek’s son Jiang Jingguo, fighting corruption among the elites and enhancing the “Taiwaneseness” of the party. Lee Teng-hui finally became the first Taiwan-born president of the Republic in 1988.

These reforms also encouraged the organisation of regime critics as “outside of the party” 黨外 who demonstrated for further political reforms and Taiwanese independence. International pressure urged KMT hardliners to give in and engage in negotiations with the opposition that in turn formed a political party (Democratic Progressive Party民進黨 ) in 1986.

Together with the end of martial law in July 1987, this marks the democratisation of Taiwanese politics. The KMT now spear-headed the reform movement, thus staying in power.

The first direct presidential elections were held in March 1996, and won by Lee Teng-hui with 54% of the popular vote. Under Lee, the KMT fractioned in a moderate pro-Taiwan independence stand and one subscribing to the reunification dogma. This dispute was never fully settled and exercises its impact still today, making the KMT’s opinion towards the Taiwan issue a rather blurry one.

The DPP stand, on the other hand, is pretty clear (although the party itself is not less fractioned than the KMT): it strives for full independence and application at the UN under the name of Taiwan. President Chen Shui-bien has therefore repeatedly promised public referenda at the end of each of his legislatures, the first of which did not pass, the second being held in March this year.

Today, the independence issue is highly controversial and ideologically burdened. It is being politically instrumentalised and discredited by other political affairs like the corruption affair centered at Chen Shui-bien’s family.

It is my fear that none of the referenda in March will pass, because the front lines between KMT and DPP and their supporters, respectively, have hardened so much. Many of the Taiwanese won’t support the DPP referendum because of President Chen’s corruption scandal and his populist methods. Still a lot are afraid China might start a military attack over a successful vote, despite this being more than unlikely.

However, the Taiwanese speaking up for themselves is crucial to the continued existence of their democracy because no one else will, I am afraid.

More about this in the next post.

30 Seconds to Mars and what this has to do with Climate Change

You may think of the band 30 Seconds to Mars what you will (and I do!), you might like them or not, but I think we can agree about one fact:

They are using their popularity (that to some extent is the popularity lead singer and actor Jared Leto) in a substantial and meaningful way, comparable to, say, Al Gore using his popularity for popularising an urgent change in attitudes towards climate change.
You wish all musicians were this engaged and willing to take on responsibility to make use of the direct channel which connects them especially with the young kids of today, giving them a role model in looking beyond their complacent little life led in sometimes obscene not-to-be-taken -for-granted wealth and boredom.

I thought it would be time for something new and exciting I thought it would be time for something new and interesting on this blog. And since my most beloved hobby is listening to music, I thought this new feature to be a regular update on bands that I view as being underrepresented and worth introducing to you, my dear readers...

Talking Taiwan politics

Talking Taiwan Independence is a serious and important matter.

However, while most westerners and expatriats concerned with the island's future have a clear opinion on this issue, the majority of Taiwanese themselves have not, as "Black American Lawyer in China" M. Dujon Johnson notes.

It is my observation that Taiwan is both an sovereign nation AND it is not a sovereign nation. No I'm not hedging my bets and I'm not trying to have it both ways. A essential element in the conversation of independence is popular sovereignty, i.e., the people's will. On this it can be no doubt that the Taiwanese population is clearly divided among geographical lines in Taiwan. What is also important is that Taiwan, throughout its history from Chiang Kai-shek to Chen Shui-bien, has never declared independence (although the reasons why should be well-known to students of Asian history).[sic]

So what happens when a nation (?) says it wants to be part of the world community and treated as an equal...but it refuses to take the necessary steps to do so? And even if it did take political steps, would this be enough to acquire such a status internationally?

[emphasis by me]

He has a point there.
I have spoken with some young Taiwanese in and outside of Taiwan, and quite a number of them is not clear as to whether

• what a possible Chinese occupation would mean to their rights and freedom as a vital democracy.

• How immediate the possibility of a cross-Strait war really is. Again, Johnson argues convincingly that the Western Eye tends to overrate Chinese military potential:

  Don't believe the hype, Mainland China at this point in her history is not even close to having the fighting capability to take on the U.S. The question of Taiwan's defense is more a question of American political will.

  Due to its impressive economic development the country is already being viewed the factual world's next superpower - which is not yet is, and perhaps never will be as there will be no single superpower to arise, but a number of comparatively equally powerful regions on the planet. - Thus, many Taiwanese host an imminent fear of Beijing attacking Taiwan in the case of it declaring independence, although it is highly unlikely to happen.

• Their identity as being Taiwanese or Chinese, or Taiwanese and Chinese (in the meaning of culturally being Chinese, not necessarily ethnically). Some of the possibility of forming a all-encompassing Taiwanese identity has been destroyed by the bad reputation of politicians abusing it for mere self-centered reasons and an unyielding thirst for power. The good in their messages gets completely contamined with their personal habits, corruption, and further short-comings. Sadly, this will keep a lot of disillusioned young voters from going with the referendum for application to the UN in March.

I have had discussions with some people about whether or not voting for the referendum in March. What I got from that is many of them hope for a much better and ideologically un-biased UN-application - a perfect situation, in other words.
However, that situation won't come so soon. Taiwanese democracy has some problems to face. Corruption of the elites and a depressing lack of choice (which really is a choice between two - in parts - almost equally despised political parties) only being two of those.



Reforms in the democratic processes?


David Reid (aka David on Formosa), writing about "Building a better democracy", suggested adjusting the threshold to 3% for parties to enter the Legislative Yuan, since The New Party and Taiwan SOlidarity Union had more than 3% each but failed to reach 5% and thus will not be represented in the new legislative.
I strongly agree with that.
He quoted an interesting article published in the Taipei Times about adopting the Dutch electoral system:

On voting day, the voters generally mark the box of the person who heads the list and the seats are allocated on the basis of the total percentage of the vote the party receives.

In that way, there is no discrepancy between the percentage of the vote and seats allocated to any particular party.

The "twist" is that voters have an alternative to giving what is essentially a "party vote" to the person who heads a particular party's list.

Voters may instead choose to make a "preference vote" by specifically naming a candidate lower on the party list, and if that candidate receives more preference votes than the total number of valid party votes divided by the total number of seats for that party, he or she is elected.

To me, this sounds like a good alternative.

In Germany, legislative elections are held in a different manner. Every person are granted two votes, one for the local candidate of their preference, and the other one for the party they wish to elect on a nation-wide basis. In that way, it is possible to support a local candidate while given the second vote to a party that perhaps has a greater chance of entering parliament.

However, personage on each of the parties list are not listed according to popular vote but by party decision, unlike than the processions in the Netherlands. There is a 5%-threshold to parties entering parliament, but Germany has a developed 5-party-system (in which in the most recent elections in 2005, all of these five parties had at least 8% of the popular vote). Minor parties are seldom reaching as much as 1 or 2% each at the nation level.

Taiwan, however, is dominated by two great parties (one of whom has a threatening two thirds majority since January), and in my eyes there is the need for a greater variety in the party system. One way would be lowering the threshold to 3%, another would be strengthening the power and opportunities of the smaller parties. This, however, is a question of attitude (in Germany, even the two great parties acknowledge the importance of smaller parties for a vital, prospering, and balanced democracy) and would require support by the Guomindang, making it a goal hard to reach, I fear.

Back to Independence

Many have stated it and I cannot stress enough how important the Taiwanese democracy is in the modern world. Not only does it offer an alternative to one-party rule on the mainland (while also posting an equally formidable economic development, taking some of the prospering economy's legitimizing potential from the People's Republic's system).

Moreover, does it offer a pattern to self-attained democratisation for the Confucian world and beyond. Taiwan is already a global player with official political ties especially to Africa and South America, where it can serve as a good example and motivator for democratic development, setting it apart from the morally questionable, proft-oriented methods of the People's Republic there.

Again, a lot being termed "potentially", I am aware that Taiwan is far from being a perfect democracy, on the other hand this potential offers great opportunities for making Taiwan an internationally distinguished political actor, thus really exercising great pressure on China for democratic reforms and making ever-lasting ignorance of Taiwan's democracy on the international level by the democratic West (especially the European Union) harder to uphold.

I can only urge Taiwanese not to give in, nor to succumb to China's military threat, but to make some noise standing up for their UN-insured-to-be rights to freedom and political self-responsibility!

As Johnson puts it,

So in the absence of U.S. and Mainland Chinese external pressures, does the question of Taiwanese sovereignty rest upon the Taiwanese people themselves? Maybe before China scholars like myself ask the question if Taiwan is an independent country the Taiwanese people and government should ask themselves the question first.

Honestly, I am very optimistic about the future and the chances it holds. I am very much looking forward to coming back to Taiwan again, and this time with the background of deeper knowledge, being able to make a difference and assist the great Taiwanese people with what I am able to do. Formosa is a beautiful place, and we should preserve it like this.

Good night, and good luck.

How Should We Then Live, James? Jacob on the future of Journalism

Die Zukunft des Journalismus...

Werden gedruckte Zeitungen langsam verschwinden, und mit ihnen der sogenannte Qualitätsjournalismus? Werden sie von den Blogger-Heeren des Web 2.0 aufgesaugt oder vertrieben? Will im Jahr 2040 niemand mehr Zeitung auf Papier lesen?

What will the future of Journalism look like?
Will there be no more quality printed newspapers?

- I find it hard to imagine that bloggers (like me, perhaps?) are going to be the only future of journalist writing. Point #1.
As for myself, I no doubt cherish a quality article.
Even today, journalists for the most part are adapting to a new sort of media. It offers them a great chance, to say the least. For journalists who publish their blogs, podcasts, or videos on the internet can gain some individual profile and imprint their names into their readers memory.
That's what I am convinced of.
Take me for an example: I am trying to make use of my bit of spear time and read a variety of articles in different newspapers, blogs, and the like. Once you find something that is more than just worth your time, you can usually tag it with a RSS feed and transfer it to your favourite reader. There, you will receive all future posts on that XML-page (so it depends on whether you subscribe to "news" from a big site, e.g. New York Times, which would make some hundred articles per day, or you subscribe to a bloggers page, who normally wouldn't bother you with more than one or two articles a day.


I don't really see the problem posted in the article in "Süddeutsche Zeitung".
As I said before, I prefer quality articles to mere sentimental blog posts. However,

1.) there is a good number of professional journalists already writing blogs, and

2.) many of the non-professional bloggers are writing about specific topics that sometimes the media are not covering in any sufficient way, or - they are biased in their writing.

Some examples:

I am looking for information about democracy in China, human rights and so on, you know.
I would not go looking for it in the German media. Rather, I would go to open democracy or some other online forum, where there are intellectuals writing about things they know about. Take Li Datong and Lung Ying-tai for an example. Li is one of the most famed Chinese critical journalists, and he got to online blogging only because he was forced to, since he wasn't allowed the same critical attitude when writing for a newspaper in China.
But he has insight, and he is a professional.
If I were to look for information on the situation in Taiwan, I'd turn to blogging expatriats on the island. They might not be professionals, but they write what they care about, plus they more often than not have studied it. If one were only following the news home, one would gain very biased information on the topic, since most journalists are writing from Peking or care about Taiwan little if at all. From my own experience, German media unquestioningly broadcast Peking standpoints, Taiwan being renegade province, or KMT-points, and obviously part of it is not based on data. You can read more about it here.


"Quality" mass media is not always right, especially when they talk about happenings far from home.
Blogging, however, is a very basis-democratic form of organisation, where like-minded people are given a good opportunity to meet and exchange ideas. Thus, we can more easily build interest movements and exchange information. It is part of a development that Dan Tapscott calls "wikinomics", open sharing and developing through internetworks.
There is a point in just how verified the information is. On the internet, nothing can be taken for granted. However, it must be possible, to come as close to a verification as it can get. Surely, this will be so when most of the "hidden" information (that you cannot reach freely on the internet as of yet) is revealed and open to access for everyone. Then it depends on people and their willingness to blindly accept or spend more time looking for data.


I appreciate most intellectual newspapers publish their content online. Most of my information I still obtain from the websites of my favourite magazines. "Die Zeit", for instance, has a whole archive on its authors articles that you can read online, as well as publishing some authors weblogs on the homepage. This makes it easy for me to subscribe to my favourite authors' articles. In German, that would be called "vorbildlich".
I admitt, we'd have a huge problem if everyone were like me (although I am buying the printed newspaper, too!). If people stopped buying printed newspapers, then where should the publishing house's money come from? Especially since buying/selling articles online does not work well enough (as the New York Times had to experience).

Apart from online news and political questions, you can gather a lot of scientific knowledge through blogs on the internet. You do find enough information packed well enough for comprehensive understanding without going too much into detail for the lay person.


One crucial point in my opinion lies in the influence that weblogs already exert on their young audience, and this will only increase. They transport information, and thus have the power to shape consciousness. An informative and rhetorically virtuous can have quite an impact on its readers opinion.
This also means responsibility for those writing. We need to thoroughly question where the information we transport originates from.
What will be interesting to see is how blogs in China will shape consciousness of the country's young. When our generation grows into power, will there already be democratic change? If so, to a great deal this would be thanks to some brave minds continueing blogging on alternatives to the authoritarian regime.