Orphan of Asia - Taiwan and the Impossibility of the Taiwanese

Jacob Tischer, Student at Departments of Sinology and on Religious Studies,  Leipzig University, Visiting Research Associate at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan 

The debate on Taiwan's identity is especially within Taiwan extremely tense and conflictual. This is due to the problematic situation in the conflict with China, which precludes Taiwan as the largest country not represented in the UN from international participation. Such precarious existence has grave economic, political and psychological ramifications, impacting Taiwan and its people in sports, science, international treaties and health issues like SARS. Chinese propaganda suggests that Taiwan is culturally uniformly Chinese, but I maintain that the matter is certainly more complex than that. The issue of Taiwanese identity will be tracked here in its historical, ethnic, cultural, political, and legal dimensions. In the resulting existential tension of their everyday experience as citizens of an internationally marginalised, yet functioning independent political entity, and Western swing towards an economically opening, but still authoritarian China, Taiwanese elites are virtually forced to form a distinct identity in opposition to Chinese nationalism. This identity turns out to have emerged through shared historical experience and continues to evolve around the consensual identification of Taiwan’s residents with their democratic state - both key features to distinguish them from Chinese sovereignty claims.

Ethnic and cultural identity in historical perspective

The island in the South China Sea, which was known previously under the name Formosa, has been inhabited for about 8,000 years by Austronesian settlers. Because of its tremendous genealogical diversity, it is the probable starting point of the Austronesian colonization of the Pacific islands.  In Chinese and Western narratives, however, Taiwan's history does not begin until its consecutive occupation by the Dutch (1624-62) and Spanish (1626-42) regimes, the Zheng kingdom of the historically illustrious Ming loyalist Koxinga’s descendants (1662-83), the Manchu-Chinese Qing Dynasty (1683-1895) - each of which controlled only parts of the plains of the mostly mountainous island - and as the Japanese Empire’s first colony (1895-1945).
After Japan's surrender Taiwan was occupied by troops of the Republic of China (ROC) and since the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 forms the ROC’s remaining, albeit internally and externally contested, territory. Chiang's Chinese-nationalist party (KMT) ruled in dictatorial fashion through the coercion of martial law until 1987. Since the 1980s, however, lack of international legitimacy, a growing opposition movement, and external pressure on the part of journalists, NGOs, and the USA forced the regime to adopt democratising policies. In 1996, the first democratic presidential elections were held despite Chinese military threats; in 2000 a former dissident was elected president, and 2008 saw the KMT return to power.  The question of Taiwan's political and cultural affiliation could be suppressed no longer in a free political system and – in light of the sensitive political situation in East Asia today – firms more urgent than ever. In recent survey polls more than 50% of the population identify themselves as “Taiwanese” only and less than 4% as “Chinese”, revealing a rapid transformation of identity and a call for subjectivity of the formerly subaltern.  Although made possible by political liberalisation since 1987, this full-scale Taiwanisation has its socio-political forebears in the literary indigenisation (Xiangtu wenxue, literally “home-soil literature”) and democratic movements of the 1970s, its roots reaching as far back as the collective experience of Japanese colonisation.

However, even the concepts of an ethnically Chinese Taiwan are highly ambiguous and interpretative. Immigration from the southern Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong did not begin to an appreciable degree until the 17th century first through labour migration for the Dutch colony and small-time merchants. These pioneers’ descendants now form the population of the “Taiwanese” (Chin. Benshengren, “people of this province”, about 85% of the population of 23 million). The immigrants formed close-knit settlements and organisations by common language, provenance from the mainland, and patrilineal descent (Chen 1994). Sociolinguistically, Hakka (15%) and Hoklo (70%) can be distinguished among them,  but only the Hakka identity firms historically constant (Wang 2007). Hoklo spokesmen further divided into subethnical groups based on origin, kinship, or surname and did not conceive of themselves as part of a larger, “national” community until the beginning 20th century. With Hakka and Aborigines they engaged in numerous armed conflicts, but also within rivaling subethnic groups in feud strife (Lamley 1981). Taiwan in Qing-Chinese understanding was a frontier territory outside the confines of Chinese civilisation, hence government control was weak. A popular saying has it that every three years a major uprising was due, something that statistics can confirm. Local religious cults provided an important communal identity marker and organisational anchor in these conflicts. However, religion was also crucial in establishing supraethnic cooperation and in the construction of a common, Taiwan-based identity on the expense of impoverishing links to mainland origin (Shih 2006).

The Austronesians (today 2%) were subdued and until recently categorized by different civilising projects of Confucian, Christian, and Nationalist provenance according to their degree of Sinicisation as "cooked" (domesticated, shufan) or "raw savages” (shengfan), but never on their own terms (Harrell 1995).  Scientifically neglected until of late has been the degree of Plains Aborigines’ assimilation into the Benshengren group. Since in Qing times migration was restricted, it was almost exclusively male pioneers who went to Taiwan and because of denied access of females and families to a considerable part took Austronesian wives. Their offspring were recorded following paternal descent and so over the course of generations "han-ised". Due to growing Chinese “civilisational” pressure, up to the 20th century whole Aborigine settlements adopted Chinese surnames and constructed patrilineal descent lines from the Chinese mainland (Brown 2004). This fact has long been overlooked in the discourse on "Chinese" Taiwan but is becoming increasingly prominent in Taiwan's modern search for identity. Scientific evidence demonstrating genetic differences between Hoklo in Taiwan and South China is a powerful means to assert Taiwan’s uniqueness. However, the distinction of Hakka and Hoklo as well as Benshengren identities from Waishengren (literally "people from outside the province”, about 12% of today's population who came to Taiwan in 1949 with Chiang Kai-shek) reflects at least as much socio-cultural as ethnic or genetic factors. A new approach distinct from Taiwan as a geographically and economically peripheral “frontier zone” is the sea-centered interpretation of its’ “island history”, which aims to include the Aboriginals and their histories but also puts Taiwan in relation to the larger Pacific island region (Tsao 2000).
Religion has been an important factor in the establishment of identities. The Chinese immigrant communities organised locally around central temple cults.   With the adoption of Christianity, the Aborgine groups won a strong ally and identity marker. Without the support of internationally networked churches, even more tribes’ identities might have been merged into becoming Hoklo. In recent years, the languages and even long-lost identities of groups such as the Siraya in Tainan County are under reconstruction using early Dutch bibles.

Legal and political identity

Taiwan’s international position is ambivalent: De facto independent since 1949, it is not recognized by the UN de jure.  Taiwan meets all requirements for inclusion in the UN and would, unlike some newly recognized states, not have to be created through intervention. However, the ruling regime in Taiwan is the state "Republic of China", founded in 1911 on the Chinese Mainland. Until 1971, the ROC held China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council before it was transferred to the People’s Republic of China as tribute to changing political realities.
After  Japanese surrender in 1945, Taiwan was taken over by the Allies under U.S. military government authority and subsequently occupied by troops of the Republican China, but was not formally ceded to the latter at any point which in recent years has led to lawsuits by Taiwanese nationals to be granted American citizenship.  A decision on Taiwan's political affiliation is strategically postponed by the United States continuously to this day, even though more and more Taiwanese raise claim to exert their legally guaranteed right to self-determination and decision on their own future (Chow 2008). The U.S. government keeps the island as part of its protective umbrella in the Pacific in deliberate legal ambivalence. All the more surprising in this context appears recent Taiwanese history, in which the island’s inhabitants grew their state into a democratization theory model case of economic and political development.

Political identity concerning the idea of a national community in Taiwan remains controversial. Communal awareness surpassing ethnic boundaries first became manifest during the Japanese occupation period as anti-Japanese resistance. After its retreat to the island, a KMT feudal caste attempted to maintain mainland Chinese reality, trying to establish a hegemonic ethnicised Chinese high culture, which endeavored to make Taiwan a model Chinese province and suppressed alternative readings.  Exclusive access to resources by ethnic standards promoted the confinement of social groups and brought forth the collective idea of bipolar Benshengren vs Waishengren identities. Tension between both groups clashed most infamously in the island-wide 28 February 1947 uprising which was stroke down brutally and followed by a 40-year period of near-fascist rule known as “White Terror”. The ethnic groups’ hostility is still perceivable today, since Taiwanese nationalism is routinely accused of Hoklo-ethnic exclusivism - just as the KMT Chinese nationalism equaled pure Waishengren exclusivism. The narrative of Taiwanese nationalism as a history of resistance against oppression by foreign colonial powers in the eyes of some researchers prevented the emergence of an inclusive nationalism (Wu 2004). On the other hand, ethnic mobilization which increased since the 1970s led to the creation of an opposition party (DPP) and the democratization of the political system. Mainlander sensibilities, however, remain salient in public discourse, as the recent success of Lung Ying-tai’s book on the Chinese civil war (1949: Da jiang, da hai) suggests. A missed opportunity of reconciliation among the different groups may be the price Taiwan has paid for its peaceful change, as the KMT’s position of power proved impossible to be challenged effectively, leaving a critical reappraisal of its inglorious history in Taiwan out of the necessary to survive as one political party among others.

Every scientific treatise will be confronted with the fact that the ethnic, cultural, and political dimensions of identity in Taiwan itself usually get mixed up indiscriminately. Many adversaries understand the establishment of "Taiwanese identity" as a mere political project by independence supporters. The quest to create a common ethnic and cultural basis for the new political system sometimes gets dismissed as "ethnic racism" and DPP extremism harmful to relations with China and therefore to the economy. In fact, however, the construction of Taiwanese identity was closely connected with the demand for democracy, which today is recognized by all social strata and apparently also by the formerly dictatorial KMT. For the stability of the democratic state in the medium term, however, an established conjoint Taiwanese identity is necessary. Only a second, broader and more inclusivist definition of Taiwanese identity tied to state membership will work toward that end. Lee Teng-hui’s (President 1988-2000) concept of the "new Taiwanese" (Xin Taiwanren) to symbolically include the Waishengren was a step in that direction.  With further cultural development apart from direct Chinese control traditional ethnic differences will diminish in favour of new forms of expression. Taiwan's young are in the fast-paced, deliberate process of creating a specific culture blending local, oriental, and western influences. Although definitions of Taiwan's social, ethnic, or cultural identity are fragmented and contested, its political identity firms as a popular consensus to identify with Taiwan's democracy. Whether this modern and multicultural country will have to eke out its existence as "orphan of Asia" crucially depends on Western support for its vibrant democracy.

(Hi)story’s morale

This article intended to show that PR Chinese claims of a monoculturally Chinese Taiwan suffering from chronic separatism are a highly selective reading of the situation at best. It is linked to assumptions of Han Chinese identification which do not take any notice of inner Taiwanese discourses on identity whatsoever, yet are internationally accepted as valid. The people of Taiwan have gone through many identity crises and changes, from being officially Japanese to Chinese and now creating their own identity in a mere hundred years time. More appropriate to Taiwanese intrasocietal discourse would be a perspective on Taiwanese identity which centers on the reality of people’s lives and their identification with the liberal democratic system instead of relying on literature review, textual analysis, and abstract scientific theorizing. Political science would benefit from integrating the more sympathetic sentiment of such an anthropological approach of letting people speak for themselves.
A formal, internationally valid declaration of independence as Republic of Taiwan would – contrary to mantra-like repeated and in Western media oft uncritically accepted PRC propaganda – not pose a change of the much-quoted status quo, but merely its formalization. Changing the status quo, i.e. abandoning U.S. support for Taiwan's sovereignty as a "pawn" in the conflict with China, would not defuse the highly conflictual situation between the two antipodes. For the rising power will continue to invest in a reversal of power relations, or, in the Chinese perception, of a return to the "proper" world order with China at its civilizational center. Because of its democratic achievements and over many decades different development from the PRC the conclusion can only read – even in the context of legal ambiguity and political instability – international support for the self-determination of Taiwan's residents, regardless of whether one views them as Chinese or not!

Literature

Blundell, D. (2009), Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, Prehistory, Taipei.
Brown, M. (2004), Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities, Berkeley.
Chen, C. et al. (1994), Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives, Taipei.
Chow, P. (2008), The "One China" Dilemma, New York.
Davison, G. (2003), A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for Independence, Westport.
Fleischauer, S. (2008), Der Traum von der eigenen Nation: Geschichte und Gegenwart der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Taiwans, Wiesbaden.
Harrell, S. et al. (1994), Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, Boulder.
Harrell, S. (1995), Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, Seattle.
Lamley, H. (1981), “Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period”, in: E. Ahern et al., The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, 282-318, Palo Alto.
Lung, Y. (2009), 1949: Da jiang da hai, Taipei.
Rubinstein, M. (2007²), Taiwan: A New History, New York.
Shih, F. (2006), “From Regulation and Rationalisation, to Production: Government Policy on Religion in Taiwan”, in: D. Fell et al., What Has Changed? Taiwan Before and After the Change in Ruling Parties, Wiesbaden, 265-283.
Shih, F. et al. (2008), Re-writing Culture in Taiwan, London.
Tsao, Y. (2000), Taiwan zaoqi lishi yanjiu xiju (The Sequel to Research on Taiwan’s Early History), Taipei.
Wachman, A. (1994), Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization, Armonk.
Wang, L. (2007), “Diaspora, Identity and Cultural Citizenship: The Hakkas in ‘Multicultural Taiwan’”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 30 (5), 875-895.
Wu, J. et al. (2004), Reimagining Taiwan: Nation, Ethnicity, and Narrative, Taipei.


This article was published in Powision, no. 9: Identitäten, in 2010.

Journal Article on Taiwan Identity

(a shorter version of this article was published in Powision 9 "Identitäten" ("identities"), 2010, political science magazine at the University of Leipzig, http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~powision/wordpress/magazin/)

----

Orphan of Asia - Taiwan and the impossibility of the Taiwanese

Jacob Tischer, Student at Departments of Sinology and on Religious Studies,  Leipzig University, Visiting Research Associate at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan


 

The debate on Taiwan's identity is especially within Taiwan extremely tense and conflictual. This is due to the problematic situation in the conflict with China, which precludes Taiwan as the largest country not represented in the UN from international participation. Such precarious existence has grave economic, political and psychological ramifications, impacting Taiwan and its people in sports, science, international treaties and health issues like SARS. Chinese propaganda suggests that Taiwan is culturally uniformly Chinese, but I maintain that the matter is certainly more complex than that. The issue of Taiwanese identity will be tracked here in its historical, ethnic, cultural, political, and legal dimensions. In the resulting existential tension of their everyday experience as citizens of an internationally marginalised, yet functioning independent political entity, and Western swing towards an economically opening, but still authoritarian China, Taiwanese elites are virtually forced to form a distinct identity in opposition to Chinese nationalism. This identity turns out to have emerged through shared historical experience and continues to evolve around the consensual identification of Taiwan’s residents with their democratic state - both key features to distinguish them from Chinese sovereignty claims.

Ethnic and cultural identity in historical perspective

The island in the South China Sea, which was known previously under the name Formosa, has been inhabited for about 8,000 years by Austronesian settlers. Because of its tremendous genealogical diversity, it is the probable starting point of the Austronesian colonization of the Pacific islands.[1] In Chinese and Western narratives, however, Taiwan's history does not begin until its consecutive occupation by the Dutch (1624-62) and Spanish (1626-42) regimes, the Zheng kingdom of the historically illustrious Ming loyalist Koxinga’s descendants (1662-83), the Manchu-Chinese Qing Dynasty (1683-1895) - each of which controlled only parts of the plains of the mostly mountainous island - and as the Japanese Empire’s first colony (1895-1945). After Japan's surrender Taiwan was occupied by troops of the Republic of China (ROC) and since the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 forms the ROC’s remaining, albeit internally and externally contested, territory. Chiang's Chinese-nationalist party (KMT) ruled in dictatorial fashion through the coercion of martial law until 1987. Since the 1980s, however, lack of international legitimacy, a growing opposition movement, and external pressure on the part of journalists, NGOs, and the USA forced the regime to adopt democratising policies. In 1996, the first democratic presidential elections were held despite Chinese military threats; in 2000 a former dissident was elected president, and 2008 saw the KMT return to power.[2] The question of Taiwan's political and cultural affiliation could be suppressed no longer in a free political system and – in light of the sensitive political situation in East Asia today – firms more urgent than ever. In recent survey polls more than 50% of the population identify themselves as “Taiwanese” only and less than 4% as “Chinese”, revealing a rapid transformation of identity and a call for subjectivity of the formerly subaltern.[3] Although made possible by political liberalisation since 1987, this full-scale Taiwanisation has its socio-political forebears in the literary indigenisation (Xiangtu wenxue, literally “home-soil literature”) and democratic movements of the 1970s, its roots reaching as far back as the collective experience of Japanese colonisation.

However, even the concepts of an ethnically Chinese Taiwan are highly ambiguous and interpretative. Immigration from the southern Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong did not begin to an appreciable degree until the 17th century first through labour migration for the Dutch colony and small-time merchants. These pioneers’ descendants now form the population of the “Taiwanese” (Chin. Benshengren, “people of this province”, about 85% of the population of 23 million). The immigrants formed close-knit settlements and organisations by common language, provenance from the mainland, and patrilineal descent (Chen 1994). Sociolinguistically, Hakka (15%) and Hoklo (70%) can be distinguished among them,[4] but only the Hakka identity firms historically constant (Wang 2007). Hoklo spokesmen further divided into subethnical groups based on origin, kinship, or surname and did not conceive of themselves as part of a larger, “national” community until the beginning 20th century. With Hakka and Aborigines they engaged in numerous armed conflicts, but also within rivaling subethnic groups in feud strife (Lamley 1981). Taiwan in Qing-Chinese understanding was a frontier territory outside the confines of Chinese civilisation, hence government control was weak. A popular saying has it that every three years a major uprising was due, something that statistics can confirm. Local religious cults provided an important communal identity marker and organisational anchor in these conflicts. However, religion was also crucial in establishing supraethnic cooperation and in the construction of a common, Taiwan-based identity on the expense of impoverishing links to mainland origin (Shih 2006).

The Austronesians (today 2%) were subdued and until recently categorized by different civilising projects of Confucian, Christian, and Nationalist provenance according to their degree of Sinicisation as "cooked" (domesticated, shufan) or "raw savages” (shengfan), but never on their own terms (Harrell 1995).[5] Scientifically neglected until of late has been the degree of Plains Aborigines’ assimilation into the Benshengren group. Since in Qing times migration was restricted, it was almost exclusively male pioneers who went to Taiwan and because of denied access of females and families to a considerable part took Austronesian wives. Their offspring were recorded following paternal descent and so over the course of generations "han-ised". Due to growing Chinese “civilisational” pressure, up to the 20th century whole Aborigine settlements adopted Chinese surnames and constructed patrilineal descent lines from the Chinese mainland (Brown 2004). This fact has long been overlooked in the discourse on "Chinese" Taiwan but is becoming increasingly prominent in Taiwan's modern search for identity. Scientific evidence demonstrating genetic differences between Hoklo in Taiwan and South China is a powerful means to assert Taiwan’s uniqueness. However, the distinction of Hakka and Hoklo as well as Benshengren identities from Waishengren (literally "people from outside the province”, about 12% of today's population who came to Taiwan in 1949 with Chiang Kai-shek) reflects at least as much socio-cultural as ethnic or genetic factors. A new approach distinct from Taiwan as a geographically and economically peripheral “frontier zone” is the sea-centered interpretation of its’ “island history”, which aims to include the Aboriginals and their histories but also puts Taiwan in relation to the larger Pacific island region (Tsao 2000).

Religion has been an important factor in the establishment of identities. The Chinese immigrant communities organised locally around central temple cults. [6] With the adoption of Christianity, the Aborgine groups won a strong ally and identity marker. Without the support of internationally networked churches, even more tribes’ identities might have been merged into becoming Hoklo. In recent years, the languages and even long-lost identities of groups such as the Siraya in Tainan County are under reconstruction using early Dutch bibles.

Legal and political identity

Taiwan’s international position is ambivalent: De facto independent since 1949, it is not recognized by the UN de jure.[7] Taiwan meets all requirements for inclusion in the UN and would, unlike some newly recognized states, not have to be created through intervention. However, the ruling regime in Taiwan is the state "Republic of China", founded in 1911 on the Chinese Mainland. Until 1971, the ROC held China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council before it was transferred to the People’s Republic of China as tribute to changing political realities.

After  Japanese surrender in 1945, Taiwan was taken over by the Allies under U.S. military government authority and subsequently occupied by troops of the Republican China, but was not formally ceded to the latter at any point which in recent years has led to lawsuits by Taiwanese nationals to be granted American citizenship.[8] A decision on Taiwan's political affiliation is strategically postponed by the United States continuously to this day, even though more and more Taiwanese raise claim to exert their legally guaranteed right to self-determination and decision on their own future (Chow 2008). The U.S. government keeps the island as part of its protective umbrella in the Pacific in deliberate legal ambivalence. All the more surprising in this context appears recent Taiwanese history, in which the island’s inhabitants grew their state into a democratization theory model case of economic and political development.

Political identity concerning the idea of a national community in Taiwan remains controversial. Communal awareness surpassing ethnic boundaries first became manifest during the Japanese occupation period as anti-Japanese resistance. After its retreat to the island, a KMT feudal caste attempted to maintain mainland Chinese reality, trying to establish a hegemonic ethnicised Chinese high culture, which endeavored to make Taiwan a model Chinese province and suppressed alternative readings.  Exclusive access to resources by ethnic standards promoted the confinement of social groups and brought forth the collective idea of bipolar Benshengren vs Waishengren identities. Tension between both groups clashed most infamously in the island-wide 28 February 1947 uprising which was stroke down brutally and followed by a 40-year period of near-fascist rule known as “White Terror”. The ethnic groups’ hostility is still perceivable today, since Taiwanese nationalism is routinely accused of Hoklo-ethnic exclusivism - just as the KMT Chinese nationalism equaled pure Waishengren exclusivism. The narrative of Taiwanese nationalism as a history of resistance against oppression by foreign colonial powers in the eyes of some researchers prevented the emergence of an inclusive nationalism (Wu 2004). On the other hand, ethnic mobilization which increased since the 1970s led to the creation of an opposition party (DPP) and the democratization of the political system. Mainlander sensibilities, however, remain salient in public discourse, as the recent success of Lung Ying-tai’s book on the Chinese civil war (1949: Da jiang, da hai) suggests. A missed opportunity of reconciliation among the different groups may be the price Taiwan has paid for its peaceful change, as the KMT’s position of power proved impossible to be challenged effectively, leaving a critical reappraisal of its inglorious history in Taiwan out of the necessary to survive as one political party among others.

Every scientific treatise will be confronted with the fact that the ethnic, cultural, and political dimensions of identity in Taiwan itself usually get mixed up indiscriminately. Many adversaries understand the establishment of "Taiwanese identity" as a mere political project by independence supporters. The quest to create a common ethnic and cultural basis for the new political system sometimes gets dismissed as "ethnic racism" and DPP extremism harmful to relations with China and therefore to the economy. In fact, however, the construction of Taiwanese identity was closely connected with the demand for democracy, which today is recognized by all social strata and apparently also by the formerly dictatorial KMT. For the stability of the democratic state in the medium term, however, an established conjoint Taiwanese identity is necessary. Only a second, broader and more inclusivist definition of Taiwanese identity tied to state membership will work toward that end. Lee Teng-hui’s (President 1988-2000) concept of the "new Taiwanese" (Xin Taiwanren) to symbolically include the Waishengren was a step in that direction.[9] With further cultural development apart from direct Chinese control traditional ethnic differences will diminish in favour of new forms of expression. Taiwan's young are in the fast-paced, deliberate process of creating a specific culture blending local, oriental, and western influences. Although definitions of Taiwan's social, ethnic, or cultural identity are fragmented and contested, its political identity firms as a popular consensus to identify with Taiwan's democracy. Whether this modern and multicultural country will have to eke out its existence as "orphan of Asia" crucially depends on Western support for its vibrant democracy.

(Hi)story’s morale

This article intended to show that PR Chinese claims of a monoculturally Chinese Taiwan suffering from chronic separatism are a highly selective reading of the situation at best. It is linked to assumptions of Han Chinese identification which do not take any notice of inner Taiwanese discourses on identity whatsoever, yet are internationally accepted as valid. The people of Taiwan have gone through many identity crises and changes, from being officially Japanese to Chinese and now creating their own identity in a mere hundred years time. More appropriate to Taiwanese intrasocietal discourse would be a perspective on Taiwanese identity which centers on the reality of people’s lives and their identification with the liberal democratic system instead of relying on literature review, textual analysis, and abstract scientific theorizing. Political science would benefit from integrating the more sympathetic sentiment of such an anthropological approach of letting people speak for themselves.

A formal, internationally valid declaration of independence as Republic of Taiwan would – contrary to mantra-like repeated and in Western media oft uncritically accepted PRC propaganda – not pose a change of the much-quoted status quo, but merely its formalization. Changing the status quo, i.e. abandoning U.S. support for Taiwan's sovereignty as a "pawn" in the conflict with China, would not defuse the highly conflictual situation between the two antipodes. For the rising power will continue to invest in a reversal of power relations, or, in the Chinese perception, of a return to the "proper" world order with China at its civilizational center. Because of its democratic achievements and over many decades different development from the PRC the conclusion can only read – even in the context of legal ambiguity and political instability – international support for the self-determination of Taiwan's residents, regardless of whether one views them as Chinese or not!

Literature

Blundell, D. (2009), Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, Prehistory, Taipei.
Brown, M. (2004), Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities, Berkeley.
Chen, C. et al. (1994), Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives, Taipei.
Chow, P. (2008), The "One China" Dilemma, New York.
Davison, G. (2003), A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for Independence, Westport.
Fleischauer, S. (2008), Der Traum von der eigenen Nation: Geschichte und Gegenwart der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Taiwans, Wiesbaden.
Harrell, S. et al. (1994), Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, Boulder.
Harrell, S. (1995), Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, Seattle.

Lamley, H. (1981), “Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period”, in: E. Ahern et al., The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, 282-318, Palo Alto.

Lung, Y. (2009), 1949: Da jiang da hai, Taipei.
Rubinstein, M. (2007²), Taiwan: A New History, New York.

Shih, F. (2006), “From Regulation and Rationalisation, to Production: Government Policy on Religion in Taiwan”, in: D. Fell et al., What Has Changed? Taiwan Before and After the Change in Ruling Parties, Wiesbaden, 265-283.

Shih, F. et al. (2008), Re-writing Culture in Taiwan, London.

Tsao, Y. (2000), Taiwan zaoqi lishi yanjiu xiju (The Sequel to Research on Taiwan’s Early History), Taipei.

Wachman, A. (1994), Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization, Armonk.

Wang, L. (2007), “Diaspora, Identity and Cultural Citizenship: The Hakkas in ‘Multicultural Taiwan’”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 30 (5), 875-895.
Wu, J. et al. (2004), Reimagining Taiwan: Nation, Ethnicity, and Narrative, Taipei.

---

[1] Maps pertaining to the dispersal of the Austronesian peoples can be found online at http://www.map-service.de/austronesian/ (Leibniz Institut für Länderkunde Leipzig; accessed 09/13/2010) and the ECAI Pacific Language Mapping Project, http://ecai.org/austronesiaweb/PacificMaps.htm (accessed 09/13/2010).

[2] In the eyes of some observers, such as former President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu (2000-08), the 1991 National Assembly and 1996 Presidential elections implicitly mark the beginning of a new state through the exertion of popular sovereignty (by the Taiwanese).

[3] Survey Results June 2010: 52.4% "Taiwanese," 40.1% "Both," 3.8% "Chinese", compared to 1995: 25.0% "Taiwanese," 47.0% "Both", 20.7% "Chinese" (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan minzhong tongdu Lichang qushi fenbu, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm, accessed 07/15/2010). The adoption of Taiwanese identity is taking place faster than the desire for its political expression: Concerning the question of political affiliation in 2010 a total of 46.3% opted for "independence" or "keeping the status quo forever" (up from 20.9% in 1994), 11.1% preferred immediate or delayed unification with China (1994: 20.0%), while 36.6% chose keeping the status quo for the foreseeable future (1994: 38.5%) (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan minzhong Taiwanren / Zhongguoren rentong qushi fenbu, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm, accessed 07/15/2010). The PR China enhances its irredentist claim to ownership by threat of military action in the event of attempted "separation". The conflict with Taiwan is part of the founding myth of the People’s Republic to this day, forming the basis of its legitimacy as guardian of sacred territorial integrity and giving meaning to Chinese nationalism via delivering a concrete goal-at-hand.

[4]  Although extant also in China, the groups are not considered ethnically different but are subsumed among the "Han Chinese" despite significant cultural and linguistic differences, which is also the way they are generally accepted in Western scientific discourse. Questioning these assumptions would have far-reaching implications: Who or what are the Han? To what degree is China culturally coherent, how "Chinese" is it?

[5] Interchangeably used was the pseudo-geographic binary division into "Plains” and "Mountain" tribes. Following modern Western scientific interpretations, 14 different aboriginal groups are officially recognized in Taiwan today and some more waiting for State recognition. The earlier pejorative names are still part of common vocabulary and get used under certain circumstances.

[6] The case is similar, for example, in India where national identity is also fragmentary, and in imperial China. However, the Communist Party’s extremely anti-religious policies have led to the separation of local identities from religion and – with the exception of the geographical and ethnic borders (Tibet, Xinjiang) – to greater national cohesion.

[7] Application of the One-China Principle; worldwide 23 mostly smaller states recognize Taiwan (ROC) as China’s official representation. Taiwan does participate in the WTO as „Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu“.

[8] Well-known Roger Lin and Dick Hartzell filed a lawsuit for US sovereignty over Taiwan as recently as 2009, a court hearing transcript can be found at http://www.southnews.com.tw/specil_coul/chiang/image/%E6%9E%97%E5%BF%97%E6%98%87%E7%AD%89%E4%BA%BA%E6%8E%A7%E7%BE%8E%E6%A1%88%E5%8F%A3%E9%A0%AD%E8%BE%AF%E8%AB%96%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87.pdf (31pp.), with insightful blogger Michael Turton discussing it at http://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2009/02/lin-trial-transcripts-does-us-have.html.

[9] Lee’s inclusionist stance drew heavily on ideas developed by rival presidential candidate and long-term democracy activist and refugee, Peng Ming-min, who wanted to replace Chinese nationalism in Taiwan with an inclusive political atmosphere into which everybody loyal to Taiwan would be welcomed.

Einmal Japan und zurück – Nuancen des populären neuen taiwanischen Kinos

Filmrezension

Einmal Japan und zurück – Nuancen des populären neuen taiwanischen Kinos

In diesem Artikel werden gegenwärtige kulturpolitische Tendenzen in Taiwan anhand der drei aktuellen und kommerziell erfolgreichen Filme CAPE NO. 7 海角七號, MONGA 艋舺 und 1895 IN FORMOSA 一八九五 beleuchtet.

Cape No. 7 – Heimatfilm mit Wohlfühlatmosphäre

„Fuck Taipei!“ – mit diesen Worten beginnt Wei Te-Shens 魏德聖 Kassenschlager, der kommerziell erfolgreichste einheimische Film überhaupt. Und das ist durchaus programmatisch zu verstehen, spielt der Rest der Handlung doch fernab vom hochmodernen, kosmopolitischen und (dennoch) „hochchinesischen“ Taipei.

Wir befinden uns in und um Hengchun, der südlichsten Stadt Taiwans kurz vor dem Kenting-Nationalpark mit ihren malerischen alten Stadttoren. Hier wird noch Betelnuss gekaut, grundsätzlich ohne Helm Moped gefahren und – in Taiwanisch kommuniziert. Dabei ist die Handlung an sich zu vernachlässigen: Mit den örtlichen Gepflogenheiten über Kreuz stehende Japanerin versucht, das Konzert eines japanischen Schmusesängers am Strand zu organisieren, wird in lokale Machtkämpfe verwickelt und muss schließlich eine wild zusammengecastete Vorband aus dem Ort bühnenreif trimmen. Zwischendurch wird sie mit allerhand exzentrisch-trinkfester lokaler Gesellschaft und Folklore konfrontiert und verliebt sich in den mürrischen Aushilfsbriefträger, der – Ironie des Holzhammers – zu allem Überfluss auch noch Vorband-Sänger wider Willen ist. Kurz, die Lovestory wirkt nicht gerade nachvollziehbar, beansprucht die Nerven und strapaziert den Film auf insgesamt 2:10 Stunden, wobei der Höhepunkt eigentlich schon 40 Minuten vor dem Ende erreicht ist. Die Hauptdarsteller sind entweder kratzbürstig und mit dem immer gleichen Stirnrunzelblick gesegnet (Aga), oder kreischende Nervensägen (Tomoko). Dennoch kennt den Film in Taiwan jedes Kind; viele Menschen haben ihn gleich mehrfach im Kino angesehen, obwohl der Wiedersehfaktor bedenklich nah gegen Null tendiert. Don’t get me wrong, wie sie auch habe ich den Film sehr genossen – aber warum nur?

Das liegt vor allem am kuscheligen Heimatfilmflair einer fröhlichen Südtaiwan-Idylle mit Sonne, Meer und urigen Taiyu 台語-Sprechern, die kein Blatt vor den Mund nehmen. Taiwan ist eine kleine Insel, ein jeder ihrer Bewohner kann dies also mit eigenen Erlebnissen verknüpfen. Hier stecken denn auch das Herz und die Seele des Films: Es sind die sympathisch-skurrilen Figuren, die ihn sehenswert machen. Allen voran die älteren Darsteller, der überdrehte behornbrillte „Nationalschatz“ Opa Mo, der notorisch gut gelaunte Schlagzeuger „Frosch“ und Stadtratsvorsitzender Hung, dargestellt von Jonny Lin, welcher gerade seinen zweiten Frühling erlebt und mit seinen glaubwürdigen Rollen in Cape No. 7 und Monga Kultstatus im aktuellen taiwanischen Kino erspielt hat. Ihre für jeden Taiwan-Besucher durchweg nachvollziehbaren Charaktere würden in der ernsten Karriere- und Bürokratensprache Hochchinesisch nicht annähernd funktionieren. Implizit befördert Cape No. 7 damit aber eine Art „innerer Exotisierung“ Taiwans, einer Insel, deren großteils urbane Bevölkerung eben im Alltag kaum noch mit der beschaulichen dörflichen Atmosphäre in Kontakt kommt. Was nicht schlecht sein muss.

1895 – Rückblick voraus auf das neue Taiwan

Den Rahmen der Handlung bildet die japanische Eroberungskampagne zu Beginn der Besetzung Taiwans, welche aus zwei Perspektiven verfolgt wird: derjenigen der aufgeklärt und mitfühlend porträtierten Eroberer, die die Schönheit der Landschaft bewundern, und jener der lokalen Widerständler in der Gegend um das heutige Hsinchu. Kommuniziert wird in dem Film ausschließlich auf Hakka, Hoklo und Japanisch. Im Grunde sind die Motive beider Filme erstaunlich ähnlich. Sie heben Taiwans soziokulturelle und linguistische Diversität hervor. Gezeigt wird ein vielschichtiges Taiwan, das keine rein „chinesische“ Realität widerspiegelt, sondern in dem japanische Einflüsse keineswegs zweitrangig sind.

Im historischen Epos 1895 geschieht das ganz explizit in der Verbindung der Perspektiven von Besatzern und Widerstandskämpfern. Cape No. 7 sucht die Verbindung zur Vergangenheit über Liebesbriefe aus japanischer Zeit (die aber seltsam enthoben vom Filmgeschehen bleiben), heutige Popkultur-Verbindungen und Opa Mo, der beide zeitlichen Ebenen in einer Person verkörpert. Im Internet war Kritik zu lesen, warum eine ehemals japanisch kolonisierte Gesellschaft heute die Zeit der Kolonisierung schönfärben und darüber hinaus freiwillig zu ihrer erneuten „kulturellen Kolonisierung“ beitragen würde.[I.] Interessanterweise machen die in Cape No. 7 am japanisch-taiwanischen Kulturaustausch beteiligten Taiwaner durchweg von ihrer Subjektivität Gebrauch. Sie lassen sich keineswegs instrumentalisieren oder gar kolonisieren, sondern vermischen Elemente einer ganz Ostasien beeinflussenden japanischen Popkultur mit entschieden lokalen Ingredienzen.

Japan ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil des gegenwärtigen kulturellen Diskurses in „multicultural Taiwan“. Einerseits eine politisch geförderte Tendenz, entspricht sie andererseits aber auch den Realitäten sich rapide wandelnder Kulturen. Die Wahrung und Förderung kultureller Diversität ist eines der wichtigsten Projekte des v.a. DPP-geführten ersten Jahrzehnts seit 2000. Das Konsumverhalten der taiwanischen Kinobesucher zeigt hingegen nicht (nur) den Erfolg jener Politik, sondern vielmehr ihre Notwendigkeit. Politische Freiheit seit den 90er Jahren ermöglicht die freie Entfaltung von persönlicher wie Gruppen-Identität, was in 1895 und Cape No. 7 durch Kooperation und Heiterkeit in einer insgesamt wohlsituierten Gesellschaft positiv bewertet wird. 1895 handelt von reichen Hakka-Familien, traditionell stärker einem mythischen chinesischen Heimatland verbunden, doch veranlasst sie ihr Widerstandskampf gegen die Japaner zu enger Kooperation mit einer Bande von Hoklo-Freischärlern und ihren Ureinwohner-Kompagnons, nicht zum Partikularismus, sondern zur Vergemeinschaftung einer geographisch eng umschriebenen Schicksalsgemeinschaft. In Cape No. 7 wird großteils auf Taiyu kommuniziert, doch wird neben Japan auch Hakka („Malasun!“) und Ureinwohnern (vom Stamm der Rukai) große Präsenz eingeräumt. Geradezu symbolisch vereint wird „multicultural Taiwan“ in der auf der Bühne stehenden Band (allerdings ohne Waishengren, dafür mit christlichem Beistand), zu der sich im Duett einer polyglotten Version von Schuberts „Heidenröslein“(!) der japanische Minnesänger gesellt. Die Versuchung ist groß, die für manchen Slapstick genutzte Präsenz des Christentums im Film als weiteren Beleg anzuführen. Die Verbildlichung (des Wunsches?) eines harmonischen, auf Heiterkeit beruhenden Miteinanders der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen könnte das wahre Verdienst von Cape No. 7 sein. Auch wenn sich in der Realität Probleme ergeben, die der Film verschweigt, etwa die Vermarktung von „Ureinwohner-Schnaps“ durch Han-Entrepreneurs (Malasun) und die einhergehende Stigmatisierung der Yuanzhumin als allzeit benebelt-fröhliche Ohnesorgs.

Monga – Die nostalgische Verklärung des Bandenalltags

„These are the real Taiwan gangsters: Vulgar yet powerful (俗擱有力)!“

Doze Nius 鈕承澤 Film ist der zweite kommerziell äußerst erfolgreiche taiwanische Film seit Cape No. 7, dabei aber stilistisch anspruchsvoller und durchaus ansehnlich. Er erzählt eine Coming of Age-Geschichte in den Achtzigern im alten Taipeher Viertel Bangkah/Monga. Die Übernahme Mongas durch Waishengren stellt hier eine Zäsur dar, den Abschluss der guten alten Zeit. Von nun an gelten andere Spielregeln, es wird hart und auf Hochchinesisch verhandelt, Gewalt inbegriffen. Nicht zufällig endet gleichzeitig die Jugend der Hauptfiguren. Die Umstände werden rauer, die bisherige Leichtigkeit und Sorglosigkeit eines trotz aller Bandenkämpfe scheinbar behüteten Aufwachsens weicht dem Prinzip des Überlebens des Stärksten und endet in gegenseitigem Verrat. Taiwan hat seine Unschuld verloren.

Liebe zum Detail, Zeitlupen, intelligent eingesetzte Musik (in der Tradition von Millennium Mambo), die Faustkämpfe zu Walzer-Einlagen werden lässt, Kameraschwenks, Farben, die das Taiwan der 80er Jahre lebendig machen. Wirre Verfolgungsjagden durch schmale Gassen wellblechbedeckter Einstockhäuser, groteske Massenschlachten vor den Marksteinen Taipeis bis heute, Longshan-Tempel, Huaxi-Nachtmarkt und Snake Alley. Eine Geschichte von Freundschaft, Zusammenhalt und Erwachsenwerden. Jugendliches Balgen. Aberwitzige Situationen und wohldosierte Komik suggerieren die Sorglosigkeit unbeschwerten Lebens. Trügerisch, wie sich herausstellen soll. Denn das Leben im Gangstermilieu kann ein ernstes sein. All das, die bekannten Orte, die komödienhafte Leichtigkeit, der Gebrauch eines leicht ironischen Taiyu erzeugen ähnlich wie in Cape No. 7 eine Identifikation der Kinobesucher mit den Hauptfiguren, auf die sie im von hochanspruchsvollen Arthouse-Movies und belanglosen Schnulzen geplagten taiwanischen Kino lange gewartet haben. Allen voran der unwiderstehliche Boss Geta, gespielt von Jonny Lin. Spielerisch wird Geschichte aufgearbeitet und über das populäre Medium Film eine alternative Narrative taiwanischer Subjektivität erzeugt, die das Alltagsgeschehen und seine ganz normalen Helden und Unholde in den Fokus rückt. Nicht prominent, doch auch hier kommt Japan vor, als Ort der Sehnsucht für den jungen Hauptdarsteller. Konsequenterweise endet die Geschichte denn auch in einem versucht-poetischen, dabei jedoch vor allem pathetischen Verwandeln von Blutstropfen in fallende Kirschblüten – unmissverständliche Symbolik.

Ein zwar langer, bis auf das überdramatisierte Ende aber gelungener, kurzweiliger Film, der keinem weh tut. Man merkt Niu seine Zusammenarbeit mit Hou Hsiao-Hsien punktuell an. Als Bonus bekommt man einen Eindruck von den modischen Stilverbrechen Ostasiens, was Frisuren anbelangt. Das macht Lust auf mehr neues Kino aus Taiwan. Absolute (Geheim-?)Tipps sind die Episodenfilme des Paares Lou Yi-an 樓一安 und Singing Chen 陳芯宜, GOD MAN DOG 流浪神狗人 [II.] und A PLACE OF ONE’S OWN 一席之地, jeweils mit dem großartigen Jack Kao 高捷 in einer wunderbaren Rolle. Kaum warten mag ich auf das nächste Werk des Cape-Autoren, der nun aufgrund seiner Bekanntheit endlich seinen lange vertagten Film über den Wushe-Vorfall 霧社事件 von 1930, SEEDiQ BALE 賽德克·巴萊 [III.], finanziert bekommt. jt

Monga kommt am 9. Dezember 2010 als Monga – Gangs of Taipeh in die deutschen Kinos. Am 25. November startet die von Wim Wenders produzierte romantische Komödie Au Revoir Taipei.

(erscheint in Dianmo 11, http://dianmo.wordpress.com/ausgaben/)

Anmerkungen

I. Taiwanonymus, Movie Review: Cape No. 7, Kommentare, http://taiwanonymous.blogspot.com/2008/10/movie-review-cape-no-7.html.

II. Film reviews: http://home.snafu.de/fsk-kino/archiv/godmandog.htm, http://blog.taiwan-guide.org/2008/04/god-man-dog-movie-review/.

III. 5 Min. Trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yD1Mhl0MQVw&feature=related, Blog: http://www.wretch.cc/blog/seediq1930&category_id=12897222. Der Wushe-Vorfall war ein Aufstand der Dekedaya, die auf Kopfjagd gegen ihre japanischen Besatzer gingen, vgl. Rudolph, Taiwans multiethnische Gesellschaft, 127f.

Abbildungen

Cape No. 7_1 http://anna69.pixnet.net

Cape No. 7_2 http://cape7.pixnet.net

Monga_1 www.mongathemovie.com

Monga_2 http://en.wikipedia.org

1895 In Formosa http://asianmediawiki.com

post-national Taiwan?

Hypothesis:

In order to avoid becoming a subdued colonised dependent again -- this time the PRC's -- Taiwan might have to develop nationalism first to become a post-national society in the future. Where there's no (internationally recognised) nation, there can be no post-nationalist structure. By developing a post-nationalist attitude transcending conventional politics and replacing the political sphere with "entertainment", "culture", or "economic gain", the Taiwanese would risk their political independence and freedom. This would not be selling out, rather would it be incredibly naive.

Formosa Betrayed - film review

First of all, this is an important movie to see for everyone with an interest in Taiwanese or Asian history. Though mostly fictional, the film is based on a number of events in the 1980s. The good thing is: This movie is political, and it takes sides. Portraying the KMT regime in such a highly critical fashion, I don't think this movie might have been shot even in today's Taiwan. Although officially aiming at a neutral stance between blue and green, the movie must be called pro-TI (strange thing that neutrality today seems to imply the avoidance of mentioning anything shady about the KMT's past, or a "status quo" position in between independence and unification while altering the status quo via economic dependence is credited perfectly "neutral").



So, while the fact that it is a Hollywood produced flick surely has its advantages (concerning mostly the movie's outreach), there come a number of flaws with it. (I won't complain about Dawson's Creek ex teen idol Van der Beek starring the lead role.) Unfortunately, the acting is not very convicting since director Adam Kane was mostly relying on American actors with Asian background. Of course, their English is perfect, while there is only little Chinese in the movie and even less use of the Taiwanese language (except for the Kaohsiung demonstration). How police officer Chen was stumbling his few sentences in Mandarin - hurt. Even the most committed actor in this movie - Will Tiao - had an unmistakable American accent to his Chinese. This seriously made the film's atmosphere suffer. Another point of critique has to be its being shot in Thailand, which also means that the entire extra cast was Thai - and I would maintain that you can actually tell Taiwanese apart from Thai. The extra cast in a weird way did not feel involved in the film at all, most strikingly in the demonstration scene in Kaohsiung. I have seldom seen an agitated crowd acting less agitated. Even when security police was marching on, people hardly seemed to take notice and adjust their behaviour. The pictures of streets and houses had a certain artificial feel to them, like you could tell they were studio-made. I don't really buy into Thai studios being able to resemble Taiwan in the 80s more than parts of Taiwan today. Sure, the costs would have been higher, but if wanted there would have been some way...

To be honest, I was disappointed by the movie's overall artisanry. Like I said, this is an important movie, for it also depicts historical material (background on Chiang Kai-shek, the US and Red China etc.), but it will have a hard time attracting people solely for its entertainment value. This being said, I wish the film could be seen by more Taiwanese kids. Perhaps they will like the movie for its handsome lead actor and thus subtly internalise the messages delivered in the movie which present an alternative to mainstream KMT-imposed amnesia on its shady past. For this matter, it is definitely good news that Formosa Betrayed was showed to members of US Congress, too.
The film's title alluding to George Kerr's legendary journalist account of suppressed and abused Taiwan (1965) is a bit misleading, for at least I would expect a work more equivalent in content and quality to wear this book's name.

Citing film critic Roger Ebert on the movie:

As a result, "Formosa Betrayed" begins rather awkwardly, but ends by making a statement that explains a great many things. One question left unasked: Why did we promise to defend Taiwan with nuclear weapons but refuse to recognize it as a sovereign nation?

Review and presentation with more pictures in Chinese.
The Boston Globe has a review of the movie, and says the following of the acting:

Tiao is a passable actor at best, but he’s infinitely more genuine than Van Der Beek, who continues to be the same limited performer he was on TV’s “Dawson’s Creek,’’ just older, and, in this case, sweatier.

As a political thriller, “Formosa Betrayed’’ has enough suspense and intrigue to pull viewers along willingly. It doesn’t try too hard, which is refreshing. John Heard plays a veteran FBI colleague of Kelly’s; in another thriller he might be a double agent, but here he’s every bit as average as he seems.

And as a history lesson, the film is a decent primer. It will enlighten those who may not know much about the post-World War II era of Chinese rule over the island the Dutch named Formosa, a.k.a. Taiwan.

Along comes the trailer:

About my Intentions as a Potential "Scholar": the Ethical Component in “Science”

What the people of Taiwan do in their communal construction and discussion of identity, I do according to my own calling and self-understanding as a young “scholar” doing research: support for/legitimation of their constructive efforts via scientific backing (delivering “facts”). Give them a voice in “rational” “objective” scientific discourse which makes for the internationally recognised forum/parliament of debating legitimate decision-making based selectively on terms of orthodoxy and heterodoxy (“rational” vs. “irratonal”), reflecting well-hidden (or taken for granted) power structures which exercise scientific discourse to a point where certain assumptions become consent. Thus, science ultimately serves as legitimising agency and advisory committee to the political executive. Science is neither innocent nor independent. Everyone choses which side they are on. Ideally, I view it as an imperative for any influential intellectual/scholar to not act on their own behalf or blindly bear existing structures of power, but to illuminate and side with the weak, the oppressed, the unheard, to – after objective-as-possible assessment of their situation and overall environment –work towards amelioration of society according to our conscience and scientific ideals of objectivity and impartiality. I believe we should do so along our adopted standards many of which are “Western” in nature (democracy, human rights) but which should nevertheless not be withheld from anybody outside their reach who choses to embrace them. I call for political activity by intellectuals! It is us who need to be outspoken and deliver factual and reasonable arguments in public debate, but we should not be confined by the class many of us feel part of. Instead, we need to include and enhance those voices which are not heard through their own efforts. We need to remember society of the relativity of many of its ideas and convictions, but on stable ground. For albeit constructed or imagined, we chose certain convictions, one way or the other. We would even chose to “transcend” (or deconstruct, or destroy) any idea available. Thus, we need to stay alert about the consequences of our thinking. So my conviction is we shall always think through alternative views, keep in mind our own relativity, but firmly chose our grounding, for we cannot stand without firm ground. Paradoxically, although I am convinced that my belief is relative at best, I am still able to believe. I believe what I believe in, and since I know this is me only and totally irrelevant (or relative) to the bigger picture, of course I must accept what others believe in. But I accept it as equally relative, so that still leaves me a chance to try and convince them of what I believe in. However, I can do so only through word and persuasion, by means legitimable in light of my accepting their opinion.

Talking about cultural differences, there is no “universal nature” in “human rights”, but we who enjoy their liberties and freedom are to opt for supporting those who freely chose to lead lives along similar lines, even if that means opposing reigning power in a foreign context. We have to do so to ensure the longevity of these our very ideals against an all-encompassing relativism, and we can do so only by acknowledging the historically constructed nature and not given “nature” of liberal democracy, offering it to everybody as one political philosophy among many – the superiority of which we believe in – and support those who decide for themselves to follow it. Since it is a singular political doctrine with absolute claim we propagate, does that justify military operations to safeguard its proliferation and endurance in other countries? Can we morally justify the suffering and even killing of innocent people with the outlook of achieving a better or more just society for them, a view not necessarily shared by the ones so “rescued”? In any case, understanding Western liberal democracy and human rights as one political doctrine competing for power with other, structurally similar doctrines, at least allows for the implementation of military might for a better end – social peace, multiculturalism. In contrast, perceiving them as naturally (or genetically) endowed with the human condition would inextricably lead to a moral dilemma of undermining the end – the state so to be achieved – with the means employed to reach it, and so making it virtually impossible to convince people to convert to the alleged higher moral state innate to liberal values.

To the Young People of Taiwan

(A Reaction to a planned ECFA (on the bus from Taichung to Taipei, Dec. 23, 2009):

Who is going to carry on the spirit and accomplishments of the generation of those now 50 to 70 years old? It lies with you… I love you, and in this very moment I am still wondering if I love you enough to forgive you when you surrender and succumb to the solely monetary temptation of unification. At least I wish you to fight and not give up before it is all over! You still hold the power in your own hands, and the key to Taiwan’s future is yours still, and it does not lie in a Free Trade Agreement with China. It will only break the door trying to open it for a way out towards someplace labeled future.

Look beyond this narrow Taiwan Strait: Taiwan is part of the ocean, grown from the sea, comparted by an imaginary line named Tropic of Cancer, neckbone of a spinal island arc, in geoterritorial confrontation between the Eurasian and the Philippine Sea Plates which through a cruel jest of fate mirror in geopolitical terms. The sea will take you to places afar, you are an open nation, as sea farers tend to be open-minded, you are people of the south where pleasant temperatures enflame people’s hearts, you are not spatially bound to the Chinese continent, your perspective is the horizon! The ocean connects you with all places, free as fish. Open you eyes, look at yourselves and look up, let your eyes carry you over the oceans, do not be afraid, lift up your voices, be confident and proud, like I were be proud to be one of you!

I would also be so afraid, because I cannot look into your hearts sometimes, I cannot tell what you want, and whether it is the same thing we are striving for. Why do I want more for you than you do? Why don’t you think you can have it all? All at once, power and democracy, and economic success?

Everybody needs a basis, and so do you.

Your democracy, result of decades of dedicated people’s unending efforts, of your blood, sweat, and tears, it does not come by itself, it comes at a cost. You need to work for it, on it, and you need to need it to stay the people you are, the people I love. I can support you in that, and I will, but I cannot do it for you.

This my be my dream, and I didn’t stay here long enough to know what it truly is like to suffer, but for you this is but real. You cannot escape it, this is your country, your home, and you have a responsibility to protect it. For future generations; And you owe it to the ones who sacrificed so much to enable you to live that way you live now. This is the greatest opportunity, the justest cause, of your lifetime!, and it is also a mission, an assignment. Something you started. You gave me this promise of a free land full of beautiful, caring, friendly people, and now I would like you to only keep this promise.

I’m a big fan of yours, and I love you, so I beg you: Please, don’t leave my love letters unanswered.

I hope for you, I fear for you, I cry for you, I weep for you, I speak out for you. So much would I love to be with you, or be one of you, that it completely occupies my mind. I feel I can’t live without you! So I urge you, please do this for me, if you dare to accept my love, do this with all your might, and I know you can achieve everything if you only really want to. I have learned what you were able to accomlish in the past, but can you still feel it? It is not all that long ago, and it ain’t a myth. All of it is real! You are living freely through past sacrifice. Those responsible for it are your fathers and mothers, your grandfathers and grandmothers. You can still ask them about it. You are their descendants, their blood runs through your veins, which makes me know for certain you have what it takes!